In the world becoming globally connected thanks to the internet and desire to “negotiate influence and attention,” it would seem that the average person is finding themselves in a situation akin to the concerns and considerations of “international relations,” a parallel I would like to explore in this section. In my opinion, the questions of Pluralism that Dr. Hunter, Charles Taylor, and many others have wrestled with are strikingly like the questions that thinkers like Kissinger and Huntington have tackled in regard to foreign policy and global politics — perhaps the two fields could learn from one another? In Pluralism, “domestic relations” have become like “international relations”: the problems that diplomats and global politicians have found themselves dealing with for years — understanding customs, avoiding unintentional insults, learning which cultures value introversion versus extroversion, how to maintain respect, etc. — we now find ourselves encountering on an individual basis and daily, often woefully unprepared. (On this point, I am tempted to discuss “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” but I will leave that for another time.)
What else is Pluralism but an attempt to create a global and peaceful community? Questions on how to maintain borders but remain open, the benefits and limits of hegemony — such questions resemble those faced by Christian churches that ask to what degree should they maintain certain theological positions that outsiders are repulsed by (for example). When the struggles of illegal immigrants trying to cross the Mexican border were unknown to Americans, it was easier to enforce the border; likewise, when the sufferings of LGBTs weren’t personalized thanks to technology and Pluralism, it was easier for Christians to hold harder positions against same-sex marriage. How to maintain the right balance between law and human rights, between (interpreted) truth and love — these are questions nation-states face that resemble questions we’re currently facing now. We’re all diplomats now.
As we now find ourselves trying to create coherent communal order with people who all ascribe to different worldviews, so diplomates and global leaders try to figure out ‘how to create a coherent world order based on agreed-upon principles that are necessary for the operation of the entire system.’¹ Always controversial, Kissinger has argued for the importance of maintaining “credibility” in international affairs, that it is of the utmost importance that if America says, “Do x or else y,” other nations really believe that indeed if they do x, y will happen. When a nation does x, America is then in a situation where if they don’t do y, America will lose degrees of its credibility to the entire world, potentially threatening the global order. Similarly (to make an example of Christianity in this section that I believe applies in various ways to everyone under Pluralism), Christian churches established rules against pornography, adultery, and so on, and when members broke those rules or claimed those rules shouldn’t exist, churches had to wrestle with questions of “credibility”: if churches changed the rules, they threatened how seriously people would take them, the Bible, and Christianity in general. On the flipside, if they enforced the rules, they might alienate members and keep out potential new converts (though they might have strengthened the commitments of the more orthodox to church). Likewise, if America enforced what it claimed, y might lead to military action, which could cost billions of dollars and lives; however, if America did nothing in response to y, other nations might take what America said less seriously and carried out their own agendas, which could contribute to more innocent people being killed than would have been lost had America militarily enforced its claims. For Christians, just as dire, questions of enforcing or not enforcing biblical interpretations against sin were and are potentially questions of letting people send themselves to eternal damnation.
According to “The Obama Doctrine,” at least while in office, President Barack Obama didn’t think much of Kissinger’s “credibility doctrine” (in Christian terms, he might be someone who emphasized grace over doctrine). ‘The preservation of credibility, [Obama claimed], led to Vietnam,’ and likewise many claim the enforcement of biblical readings on sexuality have contributed to a steep decline in church attendance.² ‘Within the White House, Obama would argue that ‘dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force’ ’; likewise, those against orthodox readings of the Bible may claim that the church shouldn’t kick people out of the church just to prove it will kick them out.³ Many in D.C. believe that ‘American national-security credibility […] is an intangible yet potent force — one that, when properly nurtured, keeps America’s friends feeling secure and keeps the international order stable.’⁴ Likewise, many Christians believe that maintaining the credibility of Christianity in general is necessarily tied to its willingness to enforce “what the Bible says” (though that’s not always easy to determine): doing so keeps Christians feeling secure about their faith and keeps the religious order stable. In line with this train of thought, I think Philip Rieff would agree that our restraints require “credibility” if they are to successfully balance and stabilize us existentially and psychologically; without credibility, restraints and limits will collapse before our will (and it seems that this loss of credibility is likely without an X), which means “the therapeutic will triumph.”
Like nations, worldviews must find a fine balance between maintaining credibility and yet not letting their concern for it impede “being open enough” for necessary flexibility (and there is no guarantee everyone will agree on what constitutes that balance). In regard to Syria and his decision not to attack after Assad used chemical weapons, ‘Obama argued that, by going against the conventional wisdom, he was breaking the hold on American policymakers of what he called ‘the Washington playbook’,’ which Obama believed worked when ‘America [was] directly threatened,’ but otherwise ‘the playbook [could] be a trap that [could] lead to bad decisions.’⁵ For those who believed the key to global stability was America maintaining credibility, Obama’s actions were not only foolish but dangerous. Similarly, on a struggle many religions wrestle with, many Christians today believe the Bible is wonderfully useful and worthy of reverence, but also believe the Bible can become a straightjacket; in fact, some would argue that certain uses and interpretations of the Bible can result in the Bible impeding the mission of the Gospel. Some might say the Bible is important, but it’s not God, and find it “not like Christ” to use interpretations of the Bible to oppose LGBT marriage (for example). To other Christians, to use the Bible so “liberally” is a major threat to its overall credibility, which by extension threatens the credibility of Christianity. Yes, we don’t always like what the Bible tells us, but if we disregard it, we risk all of Christianity. As some would argue that in the name of national security Obama hurt national security, some might say that in the name of the Gospel, Conservatives have marred its power.
Since after WWII until presently, there has been a ‘bipartisan consensus’ […] concerning the importance of deep American engagement with the world’ and the necessity of this engagement to maintain global order.⁶ Considering Trump, populist uprisings, and Brexit, Henry Kissinger’s has suggested that the dynamic is now changing, threatening global stability, and that the change has happened mostly because Westerners have ‘been too indulgent in challenging what used to be considered core national beliefs,’ mainly the idea that America is a ‘shining city on the hill’ and that it isn’t immoral for American to try ‘to implement [American] values’ around the world.⁷ Kissinger continued:
‘Constitutionalism and dedication to human rights are among the glories of American achievement. To be sure, we went too far in believing that we could bring about democracy in Vietnam or in Iraq by defeating our opponents militarily and by the strenuous exercise of goodwill. We went too far because we didn’t bring our military action into relation with what our public could support or a strategy for the region. But the basic effort was an expression of American exceptionalism. Cold War American exceptionalism is gone. An appropriate adaptation is a principal task of a new administration. I instinctively believe that the American public could be convinced, but they would need a different explanation from the one that was valid in the 1950s.’⁸
Many Americans today don’t think America is a particularly special country (in fact, many believe it is xenophobic, anti-environmental, etc.), and hence don’t think America has any right to so powerfully steer the direction of the globe or to oversee its affairs: the notion of “American hegemony” sounds to many like a perpetuation of immoral Colonialism. For Kissinger, America is losing its credibility and symbolic power (similar to how Rieff and Berger warned communities and moral orders have lost their symbolic power against self-desire), and arguably American is losing such because people have “been too indulgent in challenging” those limits and restraints (skepticism has become too nihilistic). To restore this symbolic power, for Kissinger, America must act, in the same way many Christians believe the church must stand up against temptations to accept LGBT marriage; otherwise, both will continue their gradual but inevitable decline. But to other Americans and Christians, just the opposite is the case: America has lost its credibility precisely because it has overreached, as Christianity has suffered the same fate precisely because it has failed to extend love and grace to the marginalized.
As Kissinger has argued American values have made the world a better place, so many Christians believe the same about Christianity (perhaps citing for evidence Who Was This Man? by John Ortberg), and hence the world is worse off for the decline of Christianity. Many would disagree, as many would claim American Imperialism and Colonialism has caused global turmoil, and these same people would not agree that a loss of Christian and/or American credibility (or hegemony) would contribute to a breakdown of national and/or global order. For Philip Rieff and Berger, when worldviews and “givens” lose credibility, psychological and existential anxiety becomes not only likely but unavoidable. The world loses order to people when every worldview is equally true and nothing is “given,” and similarly, to thinkers like Kissinger, in a world where no nation has more hegemony than another, where there is no world power like the United States, world order cannot be maintained: no nation can lead the way, break stalemates, or have the decisive vote. A world order where all nations are equal is like a world in which everything is equally “given” or nothing is “given” — chaotic. To thinkers opposed to Kissinger, like those opposed to the thinking of Rieff and Berger, a world where a nation maintains hegemony is a nation that privileges some people over others, likely contributes to smaller nations being controlled and exploited by larger ones, and ultimately proves exclusive and likely to commit mistakes like Orientalism (as discussed by Edward Said). Likewise, where “givens” are maintained, there will be exclusions of those who do not conform to those “givens,” and in our Pluralistic age, many will suffer injustices and the very existential anxiety that “givens” are maintained for the sake of keeping some people from suffering.
Kissinger has suggested ‘[t]he use of force is the ultimate sanction of diplomacy,’ as many Christians believe restrictions on behavior, restraints, and the like (and consequences for breaking those limits) are necessary for Christianity to maintain meaning (a train of thought many share relative to many worldviews).⁹ Kissinger continued:
‘Diplomacy and power are not discrete activities. They are linked, though not in the sense that each time negotiations stall, you resort to force. It simply means that [all groups] in a negotiation need[] to know there is a breaking point at which you will attempt to impose your will. Otherwise, there will be a deadlock or a diplomatic defeat.’¹⁰
Similarly, many Christians believe that if believers don’t think there are real consequences for failing to conform to the teachings of the Bible laid down by the church, Christianity will break down into meaningless relativism and personal preferences, losing all meaning and authority. If all readings of the Bible are equally valid, if no “right and wrong” is enforced, then there is no Christianity. Likewise, for Rieff and Berger, if there are no “givens” for people psychologically, existentially, and communally, and if there are no consequences for opposing those “givens” or the cultures and norms of a given society, then soon individuals will find themselves suffering existentially (as we do now in our Secular Age). Rieff would sound like Kissinger and agree that the therapeutic and restrictive ‘are not discrete activities’ and ‘linked’: the therapeutic without the restrictive ultimately proves not relieving but maddening.¹¹
Without boundaries, there is nothing: nothing is boundless. For many Christians, grace without law is meaningless, not really grace, and the line between “being Christian” and “being non-Christian” vanishes; for Rieff and Berger, a worldview without boundaries is ultimately nihilism and proves just as destabilizing; for Kissinger, a “world order” without boundaries is ultimately no “world order” at all. Without enforcement and consequences, boundaries are meaningless; they may be on maps, but just as well could be effaced. So it goes with the “lines” between worldviews and communities in our Pluralistic age, and though to some this might sound like paradise, to Rieff and Berger, this ostensible unification is ultimately suicidal and psychologically unbearable. Humans hate boundaries and yet need them, especially where there is an “ethic against forbidding”: the zeitgeist and by extension our subconscious thinking opposes boundaries. Few if any today wants to enforce boundaries, and in that sense, no one today wants to be like Kissinger. No one wants to do the hard things that must be done to keep Pluralism from existentially and psychologically destabilizing the world.¹² And for good reason: those actions do indeed lead to exclusivity, can contribute to injustice, and can contribute to the possibility of “the banality of evil.” And yet without “hard decisions,” the likelihood that there is an increase in existential anxiety that makes authoritarianism appealing increases
Kissinger has discussed the “Thucydides Trap,” ‘the notion that a rising power will more often than not come into conflict with an established power,’ and acknowledges that ‘in the vast majority of historical cases, rising powers and status quo powers have fallen into some kind of military conflict.’¹³ Likewise, in Pluralism, it seems likely that established ideologies and worldviews will come in conflict with rising ideologies and worldviews. Kissinger noted that ‘[e]ven with benign intentions,’ rising and established power ‘are bound to interact and occasionally step on each other’s toes in some parts of the world’ — it’s in the nature and ‘definitions of rising and status quo powers.’¹⁴ The same can be said about ideologies: it is inherent in them that they come in conflict because they necessarily entail “exclusive truth claims” (as Timothy Keller has argued). This doesn’t mean they necessarily fight, but it does mean they necessarily exist in tension, as it goes between established and rising powers, and if there was a conflict, it would likely ‘end in destruction, but not necessarily in victory, which would likely prove too difficult to define.’¹⁵
To help maintain peace and coexistence between the ideologies, in America and most nations, the State and courts play an essential role; likewise, to help maintain coexistence between nations, NATO, the UN, and the like are invaluable. As more ideologies arise and come in tension, the role of the State and courts can become more pressing, but if done wrong, this can contribute to existential anxiety (as discussed in “Equality and Its Immoral Limits” by O.G. Rose); the same logic applies with global governments and institutions. For Kissinger, ‘[t]he stability of the planet depends on its two most powerful countries understanding what the other wants,’ and accomplishing this ‘requires transparency toward each other about their motives, which sounds very strange to traditional diplomats.’¹⁶ Likewise, it is important in Pluralism for every one of every worldview to listen to one another and be fully “open” to one another about who they are, why they think the way they do, and what they want — we need humility (as opposed to tolerance, as argued by Conyers and discussed earlier in this paper). In this sense, emphasis today on the need for “dialogue” and “discussion” is important and valuable, assuming those in these discussions understand “the art of conversation”: people cannot be transparent if they can’t explain themselves, and for Christians (for example), that means understanding and being able to articulate Christian theology. Failure to so interact — which is ‘philosophical in nature,’ and hence requires people to be able to talk and think philosophically — increases the likelihood of misunderstanding, conflict, and tension.¹⁷ On an example of philosophical differences between China and America that must be understood if diplomacy, transparency, and peace are to be possible, Kissinger claimed:
‘It is important to understand the difference between how we and the Chinese perceive issues. Americans think that the normal condition of the world is stability and progress: If there is a problem, it can be removed by the mobilization of effort and resources, and when it is solved, America can return to isolation. The Chinese believe that no problem can ever be finally solved. Therefore, when you talk to Chinese strategists, they talk about process rather than ad hoc issues. When you talk to U.S. strategists, they generally try to look for solutions.’¹⁸
There are not only profound philosophical differences between Americans and the Chinese, but they differ in the very ways by which they perceive reality (as discussed in The Geography of Thought by Richard Nisbett); failure to understand such differences (which is to say which truths relative to which people groups organize their rationalities; which “acts of increasing justice” by one group are interpreted as “acts of colonialization and force” by another; and so on) will inevitably prove profoundly consequential. Similarly, there are major philosophical, epistemic, and perceptive differences between Christians, Muslims, Atheists — between all peoples of all worldviews — and failure to understand and address these differences have contributed to the heightening of tensions between all groups, adding additional levels of existential and psychological anxieties to those inherent with our Secular Age, making more likely authoritarianism in an age when authoritarianism already seems likely. In this way, we can see Kissinger supporting a “substantive diplomacy” like the “substantive democracy” found in Hunter, and that for Kissinger it is thanks to “substantive diplomacy” that credibility can be maintained without force, hence it’s profound importance (as “substantive democracy” seems needed so that the State doesn’t have to keep growing through law and the like).
Multiethnic democracies, like multiethnic government and global orders, are incredibly difficult to establish, but in our Secular Age, we have no choice but to try. Faced with the difficulties of Pluralism, it will be tempting for a nation to increase its power and hegemony so that it can just force its way through these differences, making nations conform to what the strong want because perhaps the strong nations believe philosophical differences are irreconcilable, and hence there is no other hope for Pluralism to avoid collapsing into chaos.¹⁹ It will be tempting for America to become “too big to fail” (for example, say through the bond market), hence requiring other nations to conform with America’s agenda lest they be dragged down too. As our Secular Age makes authoritarianism tempting domestically, it can do the same on an international stage.
Foreign policy problems have become domestic policy problems: “culture wars” are global. Consequently, everyday people find themselves in our Secular Age having to think increasingly like Kissinger, Huntington, Obama, and so on, when all we want to do after a long day at work is sit down and enjoy a beer. We do not want to feel like a crisis is always happening, but, again, we are all diplomats now.
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Notes
¹Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
²Allusion to “The Obama Doctrine” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
³Allusion to “The Obama Doctrine” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
⁴Allusion to “The Obama Doctrine” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
⁵Allusion to “The Obama Doctrine, R.I.P.” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/the-obama-doctrine-rip/522276/
⁶Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
⁷Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
⁸Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
⁹Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁰Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹¹Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹²To make decisions is more often than not to make tradeoffs, and some of those tradeoffs will often be those no one wants to make. Some of them will hurt people today but in the long run help them, but in perhaps personally knowing them, it becomes incredibly difficult to not cave and give into the urge to temporarily satisfy. If it is “practically inevitable” that the majority will give into temptations to sacrifice the long-term for the short-term, as made more likely by personal connections (which the internet has enabled us to have more of), then it is perhaps “practically inevitable” societies will crumble.
¹³Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁴Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁵Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁶Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁷Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁸Allusion to “World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger” by Jeffrey Goldberg, as can be found here:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/
¹⁹Both the Bhagavad Gita and the book of Job seem to suggest that the only way to resolve philosophical and/or theological debates and differences is with a (divine) show of power — does this suggest Pluralism is doomed?
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