Considering "Homo Hierarchicus"
Incorporated into Belonging Again (Part II) on Louis Dumont
…As we learn from Louis Dumont, there is reason to think that people naturally think in hierarchies, and since they cannot easily rank what cannot easily be understood, it is natural, especially in regard to what is considered a practical matter, that people rank and value jobs they understand over jobs they don’t understand, even though those incomprehensible entrepreneurships and creative endeavors create the wealth that creates jobs, rather than simply distribute wealth and employment. Wait, who was Louis Dumont exactly? A fascinating thinker and author of Homo Hierarchicus who might provide resources for us to see why humans are naturally “low order,” which means we are naturally inclined toward Discourse which favors simple causality versus “high order” Rhetoric which favors dynamic creativity (as we arguably require today). If we are naturally hierarchical, then we naturally favor the creation of systems in which those hierarchies can be created, knowledge, and/or even rewarded, which means we might need a State that can do this for us. But if the State can do this, even if we create and win the hierarchies, the State has power over the systems which make these hierarchies possible and/or real, which mean the State (government plus corporations) really have the power. This suggests why a human nature which is hierarchical could favor problematic Discourse, and I do think Dumont makes this case powerfully, suggesting further reason why we must be intentional about Rhetoric and “being high order” (which is unnatural).
For Dumont, there is reason to think that humanity has a “hierarchical nature” for there is hierarchy everywhere we look (though the West might pick on India’s “caste system,” the West is perhaps worse off in having hierarchies that are hidden and invisible). Racism, xenophobia, sexism—all of these are fundamentally hierarchical problems, where one group is seen as better than the other for some reason, which would suggest that the concerns of Social Justice might often be evidence of Dumont’s thesis. At the same time, we must be careful to conflate “hierarchy” and “power” in Dumont, for Dumont does not think “power” is as fundamental as hierarchy (even if hierarchy can lead to power).
Imagine a king who could at any moment have his or her servant executed. In one system the king exercises this power, in the other, the king does not, perhaps because without the servant, the king will be unable to maintain his rule (hopefully, the society is designed in such a way that all the social positions require one another, for this is a great deterrent to keeping power ‘at bay’). “Power” is present in both, but only in the system where the “power” is exercised, does the power mean anything and prove “real.” This in mind, the existence of power as a form can prove hierarchy as a form, like smoke proves fire. However, the presence of “power” does not necessitate its “realization” or “exercise,” a point which I believe is vital for understanding why Nicholas Dirks and Louis Dumont do not ultimately disagree.
Arguably, the problem with Dumont is that he treats “order” and “hierarchy” too much like similes. Perhaps while Dirks would say we are Homo Ordo before we are Homo Hierarchicus, Dumont may say we are Homo Hierarchicus before we are Homo Ordo. This might be a new kind of debate between Rousseau and Hobbes, but that will require more thinking. To combine Dumont and Dirks though, perhaps we could say that where there are people, there necessarily will be the potential for hierarchy because there will be the necessity for order and natural human orientation for order. This would be a view more like Dirks’ and maybe somewhat Rousseauian, whereas Dumont, more Hobbesian, might say the presence of collectives necessitates hierarchy while mere “order” (free of status anxiety, essentialism, ego-presence, etc.) is only necessarily a potential. Does order come first that is corrupted into hierarchy or does hierarchy come first which can be positively evolved into order? Do we need a mixture of hierarchy and order? Perhaps a hierarchy of skills (based on external and object-based results) but not a hierarchy of selves? Hard to say—these are extraordinary questions that require reflection elsewhere—and please note the ever-present potential of hierarchy might be why there is always an ever-present potential of State involvement and growth (to create hierarchy institutionally, as there at the top of the hierarchy might (conveniently) see reason to do).
I would argue that the “power” present in India’s caste system was not exercised until Colonial Britain “realized” this power through taking control of the Brahmin caste, as Dirks correctly points out. I will argue this does not contradict Dumont’s message, as Dirks believes, because the “form of hierarchy” was present before Britain colonized India. Though Britain created the “modern day caste system” (which is power based), Britain did not create the “caste system” beget by human nature. As I understand him, Dumont argues the “form of hierarchy” was always present in India, and I believe he is correct, which would be further evidence that we need to emphasize the “pre-societal” or “un-institutional” in our thinking, which is to say the more metaphysical, as Deirdre McCloskey argues.
As Dumont writes:
‘To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy, and a certain consensus of values, a certain hierarchy of ideas, things, and people, is indispensable to social life […] No doubt, in the majority of cases, hierarchy will be identified in some way with power, but there is no necessity for this, as the case of India will show […]’143
If society requires values, then where there is society, there is hierarchy (and thus the problem of “The Moral Real”). And where there is hierarchy, there is the potential for power, and if humans have a “hierarchy nature,” then power is possible wherever humans are, meaning we are always at risk of turning to and growing the State, especially if Rhetoric is usurped by Discourse; furthermore, if we are naturally “toward” the State (as I argue), then this means we are always naturally “toward” using our “hierarchy nature” in favor of establishing and creating “power.” This does not bode well for the growth and spread of Rhetoric over Discourse, for it suggests our very nature is “low order” in us being “toward” hierarchy (or, at the very last, order, which is a causality we can more easily grasp than “high order creativity”).
I read Dirks as mistakenly believing that Britain ’s creation/realization of “the modern, power-based caste system” means Britain created “the caste system as form-ulation of our hierarchical nature,” a mistake that could be similar to the mistake of economics who believe the existence of “capital” explains the existence of “wealth.” McCloskey defends a more metaphysical and “high order” understanding of economics, and I see Dumont as doing the same. This is importance because as McCloskey helps us place something metaphysical at the foundation of economics, Dumont is doing something similar with the foundation of civilization as a whole. (Is it metaphysics all the way down? Perhaps.)
For Dumont, a hierarchy is ‘the encompassing of the contrary’; ‘it assumes the distinction of [two or more] levels.’144, 145 With The Absolute Choice in mind, what’s fascinating here is that if Dumont is correct then hierarchy can be seen as evidence that Hegel’s dialectic is indeed fundamental and something we must respond to, and that perhaps our “nature to create hierarchies” is in response to “the dialectical nature of the world itself.” What I mean is that hierarchy is a way to live with and deal with dialectics, which we must deal with in being the ontological and metaphysical nature of the world itself. In this way, if humans are indeed “naturally hierarchical,” it could be argued that this is the case because “everything is dialectical,” providing a way to think Dumont and Hegel together. We must “manage” dialectics in a way that makes it possible for humans to live and act (especially together), and hierarchy is precisely a way we do that—but unfortunately the risk is that hierarchy conceals and hides dialectics, making it seem like they don’t exist. This is a mistake we must avoid that Hegel can help us see past.
Hierarchy does not try to erase differences; rather, it embraces them, for differences cannot be erased without falling into totalitarianism. Funny enough, this would suggest hierarchy helps us avoid totalitarianism, when often Moderns associate and conflate “hierarchy” and “totalitarian.” Dumont describes hierarchy as a way human manage and deal with difference, and so the removal of hierarchy can lead to chaos or totalization (as I think Philip Rieff would agree). The question should rather be what kind of hierarchy, not how we should remove hierarchy entirely, for the only way to do that is with totalitarianism and force.
I
Dumont notes how there is ‘great diversity’ in India’s caste systems, ‘relating to local circumstances and history.’A In maintaining this diversity, India’s caste system does not ‘neglect the individual, as the description of the caste system alone would leave one to believe,’ and in not neglecting the individual, differences are embraced through management (and what we do not manage can destroy us).B Dumont also notes that the caste systems are elaborate ‘because they allow some relationship while forbidding others, and because they are thus intimately connected with hierarchy,’ but at least, in contrast with the hierarchies of other nations and individuals, the Indian caste systems are visible, clearly defined, and thus can avoid alienation while providing direction (as people in West desperately lack, perhaps precisely because we don’t want to accept any kind of hierarchy at all).C Also, we should not be quick to condemn a civilization for setting boundaries on what a people can become; arguably, that can be merciful. When C+ students are told they can be CEOs or attend Harvard one day, though this isn’t technically false, it also runs the risk of making everyone feel like fails for living according to unrealistic expectations. Perhaps not, but the point is that we can’t be so sure we know what’s best (it’s all trade-offs).
Critically, the caste system isn’t isolationist and separating, as many Westerns believe, but instead a system to help guide interaction: Dumont writes that ‘[a]t first sight one might be tempted to [think the system is about] rules of separation or prohibitions on ‘contact’ in the most general and loose sense of the term. This approach, which the literature tends to adopt, is mistaken.’D Indeed, there are rules and restrictions, but we cannot metaphorically associate it with the Jim Crow South: it is more like “direction amidst Pluralism and/or diversity” which we may or may not agree with and/or seek to alter (and please note where people lack direction, they become “existentially anxious,” exactly as Belonging Again (Part I) argued).
The rigorousness of caste in India is relative to the locality. In a similar way, there is a different “social order” for the people in every American town. In American, it’s indefinite and uncertain, but everyone knows who’s important and who’s not, who’s cool and who’s not. Because this hierarchy is not solidified, each day, the individual must make sure he or she maintains his or her reputation so not to be demoted into a lower rank in comparison with other citizens of the community. Each day demands a new struggle, while in India, unless you violate a principle which you have complete “grasp of” and control over, your caste is secure. Who then is freer? Perhaps India has come up with a better way to manage Pluralism than the West, thousands of years ahead…
Another Western misunderstand is the believe that is “one big hierarchy” that is “the caste system,” when in true there are many ‘local hierarchies.’E Looking ahead, we could say that as Corporations corrected the “free market” to make Capitalism something it wasn’t supposed to be, so we could say the British corrupted “the caste system” to make “the caste system” something it wasn’t supposed to be as well (both were dynamic and systems of coordination that were solidified into institutions of power). Anyway, because individuals and localities are different; there is no universal “shape” or “accident” of “the form of hierarchy”: the caste system was originally diverse and particular. Each caste in India is divided into numerous sub-castes, and there is plenty of potential mobility. It is a fear of a lack of mobility that makes those outside India’s system opposed to it, and yet, realistically, a given American is probably not going to move from “middle class” to “upper class” in his or her lifetime. He or she may move between “economic subcastes” (“lower middle class” and “upper middle class,” for example), but probably no more than that (some will, sure, but likely not the majority). Yes, an Untouchable will probably never achieve the role of Brahmin, but likewise, a high school dropout will probably never achieve the position of CEO. Both are stuck in their “caste,” as organized and valued there in the hierarchies created with/by those around them, who do this as a result of living in society/hierarchy themselves. A high school dropout in America might actually be worse off, for if they wanted, they cannot be like someone from India and one day “renounce the world” and just forgo the responsibilities of the system—that requires private property, property tax…
In India, a renouncer leaves his place in society, renouncing his ‘local circumstances and history,’ but he nevertheless ‘lives from alms, and he preaches to the man-in-the-world. Ergo he does not […] really leave society.’F In this way, India perhaps offers more freedom, for an individual is able to leave “the caste system” which is to say “the system of social isolation” without then having to be isolated. This is very unique and suggests the unique and complicated role of caste in India, which also highlights how India might help solve a problem that many Americans complain about, which is the idea they can’t “live off the grind” without losing everything and proving isolated. In India, it’s possible ‘to leave society [and only] renounce the existing role which one is given by society […] and to adopt a universal role which has no equivalent in the society; it does not involve ceasing to have any actual relationship with its members.’G This being the case, can we see that the caste system before the British really entailed less freedom than what might be found in Western civilization, which often feels overwhelmed by anxiety and a lack of directly? Perhaps. Perhaps not.
We might associate “hierarchy” with “borders,” and say that hierarchy is social borders, which are needed in diversity. American has national and state borders, but we do not have social borders and/or definitions, and so lack direction in our action (because market directions). Many Conservatives argue that nations need borders to function, and that might be true; this in mind, we can say that some people similarly argue that “people need social structure to know how to act and organize their actions,” and hence “caste” is needed (what “borders” are to nations, “castes” are to societies). The greater the Pluralism (which arguably Hinduism has always entailed more of), the more something like “caste” might seem needed, while to traditionally less Plural nations (like perhaps the West), caste can seem strange and unethical, all while those same nations defend borders…
Communities in India ‘represent a joint possession by the dominant caste or lineage’; communities in America represent a collection of houses that happen to be in a given proximity and that may or may not symbolize a higher relationship.H Like a community, castes are interdependent, ‘expressed […] by the existence of complementary rights’—each has a role, takes care of the other castes, and needs the others to continue being.I Think how in America generally the police make sure the laws are maintained, the judge decides penalties if laws are broken, and there are many other authoritative roles and castes, such as Catholic preachers or mayors. Similarly, in India’s caste system, there is an ‘internal caste government,’ and the supreme authority is within the caste assembly, rather than a single individual.J Furthermore, ‘many castes, who may differ in their customs and habits, live side by side, agreed on the code which ranks them and separates them.’K
With undefined castes and indefinite borders between them, do Americans so readily sit down beside those they consider different and even “less than them,” afraid their reputation will be tainted, or social identity effected. We’ve all grown up under peer pressure, hanging out with the cool kids, and avoiding the uncool. This is perhaps because, with indefinite borders, we are caught in a tension of desiring to be assimilated into and/or associated with “the cool kids” or “those with status,” and yet not with the lame or lesser (with only the evanescent and unknowable perception of those around us by which to orientate what we should do). We have no comfort of solid lines, and perhaps Americans are more vulnerable to social games, manipulations, and tensions. Again, we may scorn the idea of “social boundaries” and “castes,” but without them social interactions can be “a social game” that makes relationships feel fake. When people of different castes interact though, perhaps it’s more likely to feel genuine? Perhaps it’s easier to feel free? Does this mean “caste” can help in freedom? Indeed, and perhaps “The Meaning Crisis” just needs “caste?” Hard to say.
II
We can start to see here how the “caste system” can be a sophisticated sociotechnology that helps people live with diversity and Pluralism without being overwhelmed by “existential anxiety”—there are perhaps things the West can learn from India. Ronal B. Inden notes how in popular perception there can be a notion that ‘the essence of Western thought is practical reason, that of India a dreamy imagination […] the essence of Western society is the free (but selfish) individual, (the essence) of India an imprisoning (but all providing) caste system. But is this really so?’L
What the West has interpreted as “irrational” has perhaps been examples of sociotechnologies and psychotechnologies which the East, perhaps in ways more diverse than the West, has dealt with Pluralism, tools which now the West finds itself needing but struggle to see in India because of previous labels and Orientalism (Vincent Smith wrote on India that ‘no evolution took place’ politically, and then we have the statements of Mills, Hegel, Burke…).M During British colonization, India was perceived as ‘lost in dreams and divided into castes,’ ‘the one surviving monument of the primitive world,’ and it was believed that India’s thought process was inferiorly ‘constructed as dream’ rather than as rational.N, O, P If it is the case that now the West is being eaten by “autonomous rationality” and consequently unable to address “The Meta-Crisis,” perhaps we can say we are paying dearly for our Orientalism, which perhaps also contributed to an ignoring of “The Modern Counter-Enlightenment,” which may have helped us from seeing the West as a distinct monolith, distinct from the East, thus helping us open up to the thought we needed to be “nonrational,” A/B, and hence non-autocannibalistic. Racism can hurt the racist…
In Europe, Hindus were ‘portray[ed] […] as mystics’ and Hinduism taken as a ‘world-renouncing’ versus ‘world-accepting’ religion which ultimately ‘did not yield up an ethical orderly religion of good.’Q, R, S‘[T]he knowledge of the Orientalist, [was] therefore, privileged in relation to that of Orientals, and it invariably place[d] itself in a relationship of intellectual dominance over that of the Easterners’; hence, India was seen as inferior, which has perhaps contributed to an interpretation of the caste system that did not appreciate it as a sociotechnology for dealing with Pluralism.T ‘The European scholars and their doubles, the colonial administrators and traders, assumed for themselves the power to know these hidden essences of the Other and to act upon them,’ a mindset which perhaps contributed to Westerners viewing society and diversity not as things which had to be managed (via a sociotechnology like the “caste system”) but things which could be solved—leading to all kinds of trouble.U India was seen as lacking the capacity ‘to act effectively upon their world and […] give personal or intersubjective significance to it,’ precisely because they were only seen as “managing” their society versus “solving” it—only today is the West seemingly starting to realize that ultimately Pluralism comes down to management, that the dream of ‘mov[ing] a community towards [some] natural and spiritual destiny’ is dangerous.V, W
If India disagreed with Western conceptions of it, then India was easily seen as unable to understand itself, and so were ignored for their own good (the problem of the irrational is being irrational, after all ). ‘Quests for essences have been accompanied by a tendency to deny the existence of that which does not express [what is thought to be essential],’ and where “autonomous rationality” lurks, it tends to be the case that “rationality” is seen as essential, which removes all space for “(non)rationality,” as needed for A/B and avoiding “The Meta-Crisis.”Y Portrayed as imaginary and irrational, India was then ‘used as a foil to build up the West’s image of itself,’ only lessening the chances further that the West might determine a need for “(non)rationality.”Z
Britain and the West believed India ‘had to succumb to and rely upon the importation of a masculine European hero in order to create order out of her conflicting castes and races’: the caste system was to be destroyed versus seen as a sociotechnology.AA In addition to pointing out these mistakes, Inden makes the overall point that none of these mistakes could have been made without “a doctrine of essences” lurking in the background, and though I personally see space for “metaphysical essences” (by negating/sublating them into ontological relations, as discussed with Hegel), I overall agree with the point Inden is making when he writes:
‘Throughout this book I have argued that the problem with Orientalism is not just one of bias or of bad motives and, hence, confined to itself. The problem lies in my view, with the way in which the human sciences have displaced human agency on to essences in the first place.’BB
It’s a fair point, and I think taking Inden into account we can write that:
a. Capital needs to be negated/sublated into Rhetoric (McCloskey).
b. “Big Brother” needs…into Discourse (Kafka)
c. Essence needs…into Relation (Inden, Hegel)
This all strikes me as correct, suggesting that our socioeconomic order need profound foundational transformations in light of how we’ve approached “the problem of scale.” Inden is aware of the radical shift this would bring to scholarship, but this change is necessary. Yes, ‘the shift from a quest for essences to a focus on agency, the shift from the positing of a substantialized agent to the description of actual, transitory agents entails a heightened focus on the actions of those agents and the constitution of those agents themselves,’ which seems like it would require a shift from “quantitative analysis” to something far more “qualitative,” and how is that even possible?CC Not easily, and Hayden White comes to mind here—but the effort is necessary. It is true that ‘the citizen is the man who is free; the non-citizen is not’ (a notion which brings Black Earth by Timothy Synder to mind), and if the citizen is defined according to some “essence,” “norm,” and/or “given,” then society will always be fundamentally oppressive.DD A new metaphysics is needed, once which avoids giving ‘either individuals or societies […] ontological priority over [the other,]’ as hopefully The Absolute Choice defends.EE
Please note that Inden is critical of Dumont, accusing him of ‘com[ing] closer than anyone [of] equating caste […] with [India’s] civilization,’ but I still see ways of considering them together.FF Even if Dumont is wrong in his understanding of India, his theory about “human nature being hierarchical” could still be the case, but Inden might say that this is another example of “creating an essence,” which is dangerous. Inden is right to be cautious, and I agree that ‘essentialism is also antithetical to a theory that would revive action because it sees particular acts not as constitutive of social reality, but merely as expressive of it or deviating from it.’GG However, to start, saying “it is human nature to create hierarchy” is different from claiming that “an American is x” or “a woman is y”—Dumont’s claim is universal, not localized (no one group gains from his claim). Also, Dumont is clearly aware of the horrors of Orientalism, writing that ‘[p]hilosophers have a natural tendency to identify the social environment in which the philosophical tradition has developed with mankind as a whole, and to relegate other cultures to a sort of sub-humanity. In this respect, one can even note a certain regression.’HH Still, though I see Inden’s concern, I think Dumont is vital.
III
Alright, but where does Nicholas B. Dirks fit into all this? Dirks believes he counters Dumont and shows the caste system was created by Britain versus “emerge from human nature,” and indeed I agree that “caste system as institutionalized power” was created by Britain; however, I think Britain was able to do this precisely because human nature “gets things ready for them,” per se (which is Dumont). Still, The Law of Manu perhaps made it easy for Britain to carry out this perversion in discussing the role of the Brahmin so much, but at the same time The Law of Manu did more. ‘Manu was not the first author of a legal code in ancient India,’ but it might have centralized the law to help organize society—but in this centralization perhaps made India valuable to British “capture,” similar to how Lincoln centralized government power to save the Union, but perhaps at risk of creating a powerful and large State that corporations seek to “capture” and control.KK
Manu focuses on ‘the moral dimension of dharma.’KK Much of the text expounds upon the place of the Brahmin, the highest level in the caste system, and how the lower castes relate to it. According to the text, the reason the Law of Manu was written is because ‘an anonymous group of seers approach[ed] Manu and ask[ed] him to teach them the Law (dharma). Manu accede[d] to their wishes.’MM Manu unified the codes of Dharmasutras, fashioning an avenue for the unification of the tribes. Should we associate pre-Manu case with what Dumont discusses, and post-Manu with Dirks? Maybe, and perhaps post-Manu was easier for Britian to exploit, but even Manu suggests Dumont’s understanding of caste as “sociotechnology for diversity,” just perhaps more centralized. Indeed, the socio-political motives behind Manu’s composition lie in ‘Manu’s interest […] in the interaction between the political power and Brahmanical priestly interests, interests that were under constant threat’; Manu was more interested in this than ‘the lower classes of society, which he considered to be an ever-present threat to the dominance of the upper classes’ (I stress how much this reminds me of the American debate between States and Centralized Power, but that would require an elaboration on the American Civil War to explain, though perhaps this all suggests “form-ual structures” that repeat throughout political structures; perhaps this suggests a “political law of scale” like West discusses?).NN To protect and empower the Brahmins, Manu arguably centralizes and spreads religious and lawful power of the Brahmin caste.
The Manu Smriti serves as a guide on how to escape “the rebirth cycle,” which the Brahmin caste is central in determining. As the acme of the caste system, a Brahmin is furthest in the process of escaping the cycle of rebirth, and so is faced with many more challenges and chances of losing caste than the lower castes. They require more instruction, because they must carry out more rituals and preserve greater purity. This is a reason Manu is primarily concerned with the Brahmin class and why discourse ‘of Vaisyas and Sudras, the last two of the social classes, is extraordinarily brief.’OO Though there are more rules a Brahmin must follow, relative to this life, a Brahmin is incredibly powerful and seemingly only “checked and balanced” by other Brahmin—presenting a problem.
‘By engaging in [desires] properly, a man attains the world of the immortals and, in this world, obtains all his desires he intended,’ and how this is done (the obtaining of ‘unsurpassed happiness after death’) is known by the Brahmin—so we better listen to them (presenting a problem).PP Additionally, we must listen to them, for ‘a man learns the Veda without permission by listening to someone who is reciting it, he is guilty of stealing the Veda and will go to hell.’QQ Ideas can be stolen, a notion that is hard to imagine after the printing press, but this ethic contributes to the centralization of power into the Brahmins (and restriction of Rhetoric). Furthermore, there is a particular way we must ‘recite[] [the] Treatise of Manu […] [we must] always follow the proper conduct,’ a conduct which only the Brahmin easily know.RR Also, according to the Law, ‘a man who misrepresents himself to good people is the worst sinner in the world; he is a thief, a man who steals his very self.’ This defends the position of the Brahmin, for it condemns anyone who would dare claim they are a Brahmin when they are not, and it employs Brahmins to live as if they are Brahmins, making the most of all the powers ascribed to them lest they “misrepresent themselves.”SS ‘Killing a Brahmin’ is also highlighted as particularly grievous (and please note that “loss of caste’ in Hinduism might serve a similar function as has “fear of hell: in Christian societies).TT Yes, ‘[a] sinner is freed from his sin by declaring it publicly,’ but those publicly humiliated might cease to poise a threat to the Brahmin—but that would get us into Foucault.UU Stil, the Law encourages individuals to be open with the Brahmin, which might help sustain the Brahmin’s dominance. Also, ‘punishment is immense energy, and it cannot be wielded by those with uncultivated selves,’ suggesting only Brahmins can punish Brahmins.VV Yes, kings can, but we are told that ‘[p]unishment can only be administered by someone who is honest and true to his words, who acts in conformity with the Treatises, who has good assistants, and who is wise’—and that favors Brahmin.WW Not necessarily, but that “not necessarily” might just provide “plausible deniability” to keep the Brahmin in power (perhaps nothing benefits power and ideology more than the divide between “theoretically possible” and “practically possible”).
In the Law, it is written ‘a man who perpetrates violence should be considered far more evil than someone who is offensive in speech, who steals, or who assaults with a rod,’ and so revolution against the Brahmin is eternally risky.XX And those who do ‘kill[] a Brahmin should construct a hut and live in the forest for twelve years, eating alms-food and making the head of corpse his banner in order to purify himself’—he is outcasted and hence not a threat.YY But critically please note that even ‘[t]his purification is enjoined for killing a Brahmin unintentionally; for killing a Brahmin deliberately, there is no prescribed expiation.’ZZ (In American, intentionally standing up against the State can be treason, and that can lead to execution.) Following the Law is generally how one is good, and ‘those who possess Goodness become gods’ (the teachings of the Brahmin hence have a lot to offer—who would oppose them?).A3 According to Manu, ‘all the deities are simply the self, the whole world abides within the self; for the self gives rise to engagement in action on the part of these embodies beings,’ and how one accesses this “capital-S-Self” is by following the Law and the Brahmin. Only a fool then, would oppose the Brahmin, who opposing would be to oppose One’s Self.B3
In the Law, it is written ‘a man who perpetrates violence should be considered far more evil than someone who is offensive in speech, who steals, or who assaults with a rod,’ and so revolution against the Brahmin is eternally risky.XX And those who do ‘kill[] a Brahmin should construct a hut and live in the forest for twelve years, eating alms-food and making the head of corpse his banner in order to purify himself’—he is outcasted and hence not a threat.YY But critically please note that even ‘[t]his purification is enjoined for killing a Brahmin unintentionally; for killing a Brahmin deliberately, there is no prescribed expiation.’ZZ (In American, intentionally standing up against the State can be treason, and that can lead to execution.) Following the Law is generally how one is good, and ‘those who possess Goodness become gods’ (the teachings of the Brahmin hence have a lot to offer—who would oppose them?).A3 According to Manu, ‘all the deities are simply the self, the whole world abides within the self; for the self gives rise to engagement in action on the part of these embodies beings,’ and how one accesses this “capital-S-Self” is by following the Law and the Brahmin. Only a fool then, would oppose the Brahmin, who opposing would be to oppose One’s Self.B3
There are passes in Manu that suggest power should be resisted and challenged, but I cannot help if such passages are needed ideologically so that people don’t feel like they are under incredible power and control. It is perhaps similar to how the State in the West encourages people to engage in “democratic debate,” but this debate has little chance of systemically and deeply transforming power structure. However, if the debate wasn’t encouraged, people might feel like they have little say on what the State did, and hence be less likely to (peacefully) listen to it. Anyway, an example of a passage from Manu:
‘He should carefully avoid all activities that are under someone else’s control and diligently pursue those that are under his own control. Whatever is under someone else’s control – that is suffering; whatever is under one’s own control—that is happiness. He should know that this, in a nutshell, is a definition of suffering and happiness. He should diligently engage in those activities that give him inner joy and avoid those that do not’C3
Inspiring, yes? Inspiring like support of democracy can be, I think, which perhaps sounds cynical, but I also think it is a valid point. The section from Manu appears to employ people to rebel against the control of the Brahmin, but considering what we know about the Veda, and that the Brahmin are the personification of the Law (following which ‘a man achieves fame in this world, and unsurpassed happiness after death’), it is clear this cannot be the case, only sound like it is the case for ideologically-advantageous reasons.D3 In fact, it might be employed to defend the Brahmins, for if anyone tries to control the people who aren’t Brahmin, they must be ignored (a point which suggests the endless wars in the West between listening to the State or listening to the Corporations: one always employes “freedom of thought” against the other—away, in a different direction). We should ‘always[] take[] refuge in Brahmins […] obtain[] a higher birth.’E3
Also working against Rhetoric and protecting the Brahmin, Manu might also discourage striving and motivation, as suggested in verses like ‘even a capable Śūdra must not accumulate wealth; for when a Sudra becomes wealthy, he harasses Brahmins.’F3 Manu might keep individuals in an unobtrusive-place, stating that it is ‘far better to carry out one’s own Law imperfectly than that of someone else perfectly; for a man who lives according to someone else’s Law falls immediately from his caste.’G3, H3 Likewise, the ‘mixing of social classes among the people’ sexually is terrible in Manu, for this causes ‘deviation from the Law that tears out the very root and leads to the destruction of everything,’ a point which sounds to be warning against “the loss of givens” the West finds itself facing today.I3 All “mixing of class” is a problem, suggesting why nobody should try to “mix” with Brahmin (protecting their power)—that might destroy everything. ‘Whether he is learned or not, a Brahmin is a great deity, just as Fire is a great deity, whether it is consecrated or not,’ and so regardless what a Brahmin does, the lower castes must accept the Brahmin’s status and not try to “mix” with the Brahmin.J3
To conclude our consideration of Manu, we can see how it preserves, centralizes, protects, and expands the reach of the Brahmin, establishing a religious hierarchy in line with Dumont’s theory on “the universal nature of hierarchy,” which inherently carried with it the potential for Britain to “capture” the system and use it to their benefit, as outlined by Dirks in Castes of Mind. Though Manu created all these situations and centralizations of power, I understand Dirks to be arguing that it wasn’t until the British came in that the Brahmin caste become basically invincible and solidified.
IV
Nichole B. Dirks does not disagree with Louis Dumont, though he thinks he does. My hope is to show that, though Dumont arguably relies heavily on the “unknown period of time” before Manu, the very arising and acceptance of Manu could suggest it was a product of a “hierarchical human nature” that was easy to accept by humans who shared in that nature (please note that it does not seem Manu was militarily or physically enforced upon people by some kind, though I’m not sure). This in mind, we could then see Dirks as describing how the British “captured” what Manu arranged for their benefit (as perhaps the American State today has so “captured” the centralizing Constitution after the Articles of Confederation).
‘Louis Dumont, the author of the most influential scholarly treatise on caste in the last half of the twentieth century, believed that the West’s excessive individualism was the single greatest impediment to the understanding of caste.’K3 This is a fair assignment, I think, for Dumont did right that ‘[o]ur idea of society remains superficial as long as we take it, as the word suggests, as a sort of association which the fully formed individual enters voluntarily and with a definite aim, as if by a contrast.’L3 I believe this is correct, and indeed Belonging Again can be seen as an extensive argument for why the person is always shaped by his or her social environment (the presence or loss of “givens” changes everything, for example): the debate that must be had is on the nature of agency we might grant people, given that selfhood always ‘has its source in social training’ (as Berger and Rieff would agree).M3 ‘Actual men do not behave: they act,’ but how and why we act is never in a vacuum.N3 We are not “fully formed” and then enter society, but we are also not “fully formed” by society: citizen and society are always in-forming, together.
Dumont asks us to consider a person as a ‘child, slowly brought to humanity by his upbringing in the family, by the apprenticeship of language and more judgment […],’ and he asks ‘[w]here would be the humanity of this man, where his understanding, without this training or taming, properly speaking a creation, which every society imparts to its members, by whatever actual agency?’O For Dumont, sounding like Peter Berger, we cannot be free unless we have an ‘appreciation of the social nature of man,’ which ideological constrained in Dumont’s day were restricting (and perhaps still are).P3 I agree with Dumont, but Dirks brings his critiques: ‘Dumont thus began his study of caste in India by placing it at the center of sociological endeavor, and aligning himself with Tocqueville’s critical lament about the rise of the ‘novel ideal’ of individualism’—in other words, Dirks is suggesting that Dumont projected into “the caste system” an ideological projects to show that humans are innately social (in naturally creating hierarchy to navigate social relations) versus “autonomous individuals.”Q3 Dirks may entirely agrees with Dumont’s politics and philosophy, but Dirks point is that Dumont is using India in service of this belief, which Dirks resists. Perhaps Dumont was biased, but I still think Dumont and Dirks can be thought together, though all the same I appreciate the work of Dirks for it shows with Dumont how a “preexisting social system,” as necessary for social organization (especially where there is diversity) can be “captured” by power into “a Centralized State” which proves oppressive and controlling—for this is arguably what has happened in America.
‘For Dumont,’ Dirks tells us, ‘it is this same commitment to individualism, even within the sociological space of theorizing the social, that rejects the possibility that hierarchy, the core value behind the caste system, has not only been foundational for most societies but is naturally so.’R3 Dirks indeed read Dumont closely, and I do think that Western commitment to the individual contributes to an “othering” of India and “othering” of the possibility that there is something “in” Western people which could desire hierarchy and a “caste system” (a psychoanalytical disavowal which concerned about Rieff and Berger). But then Dirks writes something I find very slippery:
‘This book will […] suggest[] that caste, as we know it today, is not in fact some unchanged survival of ancient India, not some single system that reflects a core civilizational value, not a basic expression of Indian tradition. Rather, I will argue that caste (again, as we know it today) is a modern phenomenon, that it is, specifically, the product of a historical encounter between India and Western colonial rule.’S3
For me personally, this paragraph allows Dirks to present himself as disproving Dumont (which in his field would be a massive and status-gaining accomplishment), while at the same time leaving space to not have to entirely disprove Dumont. I did not read Dumont as arguing that caste as we know it today is a product of human nature, no more than the American State as we know it today reflects an innate desire for anything at all. Yes, the American State is the product of a history which prioritizes “individual liberty,” but can we say the American State is “a direct product” of that historical emphasize? Not at all—many things have happened since the American Revolution. Likewise, what Dumont argues about “hierarchy as human nature” would not say that it is human nature to create a particular manifestation of hierarchy—that’s a different matter entirely. To be fair, Dirks does clarify his view, writing:
‘I do not mean to imply that [the caste system] was simply invented by the too clever British, now credited with so many imperial patents that what began as colonial critique has turned into another form of imperial adulation. But I am suggesting that it was under the British that ‘caste’ became a single term capable of expressing, organizing, and above all ‘systemizing’ India’s diverse forms of social identity, community, and organization.’T3
I have no problem with this claim, but I don’t see it as in conflict with Dumont at all. Dirks will successfully argue in his book that ‘colonialism made case what it is today,’ but that simply means that the British used “hierarchical nature” in their favor.U3 With the phrase “as we know it today,” Dirks places his study of “the caste system” in a categorically different study than Dumont’s, and Dirks does not explain why Manu was there before Britan arrived; for that (and for why Manu formed at all and why there were preexisting systems of law which Man centralized), we need Dumont. Even if Dirks proved Dumont wrong about ancient India’s caste system in different ways (say the primacy of “purity and impurity”), this would not prove Dumont wrong about “human nature being hierarchical” at all. The subtitle of Dumont’s book is “The Caste System and Its Implications”—even if Dumont is wrong about the particulars of the caste system somehow, that would not mean he was wrong about “its implications.” A victory for Dirks wouldn’t be a vanquishing of Dumont; at worse, Dumont would suffer a nonfatal blow.
What Dumont primarily wants to show is that hierarchy always, somehow, manifests itself through India’s society without and before top-down control. He follows through India’s history to show this, and that, no matter what happens, hierarchy continues to emerge and continues to organize the society. Dumont believes hierarchy of some kind, rather a modern day caste system, an ancient system designating occupations, or an economic hierarchy of classes, is a basic expression of any civilization, not just Indian, because “hierarchy is human,” especially if “human is social,” and this is especially clear where there is diversity and Pluralism.
V
We channel environments; we don’t simply respond to them or make choices in them, unaffected. We hence treat environments in a manner relative to what the environments have taught us. For example, individuals might act like they are an “individual” if that is the idea society has planted inside of their heads. They might not (naturally) behave that way (people might naturally behave like “wolf boys”). And this is where the famous debate gets tricky: just because the “concept of the individual” is taught to people by others and the society at large, does that mean the society is the source of the individual or only a means to help us realize the individual? Though God is not real to those who never heard of God, does that mean God does not Exist? Just because a person is “really thought” that are individuals, does that means individuals don’t exist? Similar questions can be asked about “individual rights” and more. To advance this debate, we would have to turn to Hegel, as hopefully The Absolute Choice accomplished.
In my view, while Dumont talks about (form-al) Hierarchy, Dirks talks about (particular and accidental) hierarchy, and so they talk past one another. Dumont might believe “hierarchy” does not necessarily imply “power,” while Dirks could believe hierarchy “is” power. But is “the power of a cool kid” (status) really power in comparison to say “the power of the president?” Within the high school sphere, perhaps it implies a kind of power, but at the same time it seems arbitrary and different. “Social power” and “forceful power” seem different, even if something like power is always at play. A “hierarchy” might necessitate either potential or realized power, though if power is never realized and remains only in potentiality, this power is ultimately meaningless and nothingness. A “hierarchy of realized power” seems different from one that’s power remains unrealized (though they share the same form, in the same way cold is different from hot yet formally both are types of temperate).
Humans if combined into an undivided group participate in a phenomenon Dumont calls “purity and impurity,” which perhaps some have come to refer to as “essentialism,” this might suggest natural self-segregation of people into groups with visual or definite similarities, believing based on those characteristics that the members share similar interests and desires, which helps people deal with “existential anxiety” through “givens” and directions. Dumont’s “impurity and purity” could be India’s localization of essentialism, a universal phenomenon and problematic tendency. This phenomenon, rather called “essentialism” or “impurity and purity” or what have you, to Dumont is evidence of the natural tendency of humans to create hierarchies and to organize themselves in relation to others, and often (perhaps in a manner that implies their superiority over those others).
In conclusion, I believe we see in Dumont evidence that the fate and organization of humanity is primarily and profoundly tied to metaphysics and Rhetoric, but that this very Rhetoric, in always existing and having to exist, is also the ever-present threat of Discourse, which is to say the ever-present Dumont necessitates the ever-present threat of Dirks. Life and death is found in the tongue. “Language animals” are a Schrödinger-esq being of Rhetoric/Discourse, Dumont/Dirks…Humans are “language animals” before they are “rational animals” (our emphasize on more controllable and definable “rationality” might be a response of existential terror to the possibility that less controllable and less definable “language” is more important—how could we ever rest?).
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Notes
143Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 20.
144Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 239.
145Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 244.
ADumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 182.
BDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 186.
CDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 130.
DDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 130.
EDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 155.
FDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 185.
GDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 185.
HDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 157.
IDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 157.
JDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 172.
KDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 191.
LInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 3.
MInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 8.
NInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 49.
OInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 69.
PInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 40.
QInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 67.
RInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 108.
SInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 127.
TInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 38.
UInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 6.
VInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 23.
WInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 18.
YInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 31.
ZInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 83.
AAInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 17.
BBInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 264.
CCInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 264.
DDInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 218.
EEInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 26.
FFInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 78.
GGInden, Ronal B. Imaging India. Indiana University Press, 1990: 159.
HHDumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 344-345.
KKThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: xviii.
LLThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: xviii.
MMThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: xxv.
NNThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: xxxv.
OOThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: xxxv.
PPThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 23.
QQThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 32.
RRThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 220.
SSThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 83.
TTThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 194.
UUThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 207.
VVThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 107.
WWThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 108.
XXThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 148.
YYThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 195.
ZZThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 196.
A3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 213.
B3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 219.
C3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 76.
D3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 23.
E3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 179.
F3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 189.
G3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 186.
H3Let us example a law from Manu to understand how each decree might function to centralize while at the same time not making tribes feel like they are under something totalitarian:
‘A man who had sex with an elder’s wife should proclaim his crime and lie down on a heated iron bed, or embrace a red-hot metal cylinder; he is purified by death. Or, he may cut off his penis and testicles by himself, hold them in his cupped hands, and walk straight toward the south-west until he falls down dead. Or, he may perform the Prājāpatya penance for one year with a collected mind, carrying a bed-post, dressed in tree bark, wearing a long beard, and living in a desolate forest. Or, he may perform the lunar penance for three months, keeping his organs under control and subsisting on sacrificial food or barely gruel, so as to remove the sin of sexual intercourse with an elder’s wife’A
Who in the world would choose slicing off their genitals compared to the other options, and why in the world do all these different penalties need to be listed? The reason for this is, I believe, in order to centralize all of the different law codes in India into a single code. Each penalty is a penalty created by a given tribe as punishment for the listed crime. By listing all of the potential consequences for each violation, rather than replacing any, there is little reason for any given village or tribe to oppose the combination of all the codes into one. By using the language of “or,” Manu does not claim some consequences are better than others. Rather, Manu gives a sense of legitimacy to each tribe’s laws and principals. Naturally, people will choose the “lesser” punishment, or a court will rule a punishment relative to their culture, but regardless its all centralized under a single law. This can help provide direction, unity, “givenness,” and the like.
In centralizing the laws, Manu combines the laws into one system, establishing a single language of justice and encompassing regional societies into itself, making one of many. Then by centralizing the power of that system to the Brahmin class, in one incredible move, all the tribes in India are put under the jurisdiction and universal power of the Brahmins. Again, I would suggest the American Civil War for a parallel, but I would have to make that case.
AThe Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 197.
I3The Law Code of Manu. Manu, and Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 149.
K3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 4.
L3Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 5.
M3Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 5.
N3Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 6.
O3Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 5.
P3Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 5.
Q3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 4.
R3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 4.
S3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 5.
T3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 5.
U3Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001: 5.
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