Emphasis

Featured in Third Thoughts. A Necessary and Dangerous Point Given Hegelian Dialectics

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Is nearly every debate just a debate about emphasis? Well, we can at least say that emphasis is always a problem. At least in my experience, many discussions are filled with concerns about “emphasis,” and though it is indeed the case that these concerns can be valid, there are numerous circumstances in which they bring discussions to a screeching halt with little to show for it. Indeed, the causes and variables in play for a given case are rarely equally distributed, and so there is need to emphasize x over y, but the moment we do so, we can be perceived biased and ideological, and so lose our audience. If we want to be dialectical, we still have to discuss one topic at a time, and that alone can create the impression that we care more about what we discuss first than what we discuss second. That said, if we could understand that there is a difference between “emphasis as proof of ideology” and “emphasis due to unequal distribution,” perhaps we could limit the number of times when concerns about emphasis darkened discussion versus help illuminate it.

I used to be much more against being concerned about “emphasis,” but with time I’ve been convinced that the concern has a place. Emphasis can be good, for it can help us focus on points that need attention, and acknowledging the role of emphasis can help us realize that groups which seem radically different might just have different focuses. Realizing the role of emphasis, we can see potential for unity where we might otherwise see too much difference, but at the same time concerns about emphasis can be used to cause division and confusion. Many debates can just be “emphasis debates,” and though those are needed and add value, taken too far, they can cause trouble for no good reason. When it comes to emphasis, we must be careful: what is unavoidable and good in “a dialectical reality” can also be dangerous (think reverently).

I

If I say, “This city is a great place,” someone could come along and note that 2% of the population is homeless and argue that I am emphasizing the goodness of the city at the expense of acknowledging its problems—I mislead. However, in my view, the city is great, and with 98% of the population out of poverty, I believe that I have reason to emphasize the goodness of the city over the shortcomings. The other person could disagree, believing my emphasis on the good contributes to preserving the problem. However, if I would have instead at the start said, “98% of the population is out of poverty, but 2% aren’t,” the other person could still be upset at me, for the statement in their mind suggests that the 2% suffering poverty isn’t a big deal, having brought it up second, and how would I like to be one of those people? Even if my statement is technically a fact, my choice to speak it can be seen as a different matter and an act of “downplaying” poverty.

If I were to claim that some President has done “a great job reforming healthcare,” and that it’s good more people can access health insurance, someone could come along and claim that I’m overemphasis the increase of coverage and deemphasizing how healthcare costs are still increasing. If I were religious and claimed, “God is just,” I could be accused of deemphasizing God’s grace. If I were to discuss the role of gender in society, I could be accused of not discussing the role of class (even though perhaps class isn’t my specialty). And so on: my point is that virtually anyone at any moment could be accused of over-emphasizing this or under-emphasizing that—on and on. It’s impossible to focus equally on everything all at once, to be an expert on everything—we’re finite, after all, and language that meant everything at once would be useless.

Considering that emphasis is unavoidable, it often proves meaningless to bog down discussions by accusing people of overemphasizing or underemphasizing something. At the same time, if someone is more often angry than they are kind, isn’t it somewhat wrong to say that the person is “angry and nice,” as if an equal distribution? Yes, technically, the statement is true, but wouldn’t it be more accurate to say, “The person is mostly angry and rarely nice?” In this situation, isn’t failure to incorporate emphasis a failure to describe reality? Seems like emphasis can be necessary, and, indeed, it can be, bringing us to the great problem of emphasis—it can be necessary and yet prone to misuse.

II

Truth requires emphasis, because reality is not “evenly distributed.” Sometimes, economics is more the cause than politics, as sometimes a person needs to focus more on socializing than being alone, and so on. Emphasis can suggest ideology and bias, but it doesn’t follow that because someone is ideological and biased, that therefore the person is wrong. If as a Democrat I emphasize a Liberal’s good policies over the bad, then emphasis is used in the service of politics, but if it’s the case that the Liberal has indeed created more good policies than bad, then would it not be a misrepresentation for me to say, “Liberals have enacted both good and bad policies?” The statement implies equality (and perhaps I say such a phrase to come off as moderate), but if indeed 80% of the Liberal’s policies are good and only 20% bad, isn’t the statement unfair and misrepresentative? Is not the lack of emphasis on the good inaccurate? But problematically, if I’m a Democrat, aren’t I likely to think more Liberal policies are good than bad and thus believe emphasizing the good is necessary for “accurately depicting reality?” And in the eyes of a Republicans, perhaps 80% of the policies are bad and 20% good, so when I as a Liberal emphasize “the good policies,” which I believe I am doing for the sake of depicting reality, the Republican will easily conclude that I’m using emphasis in service of ideology and bias. From one perspective, I use emphasis to “accurately represent”; from another, I use emphasis to mislead.

If it is true that x is more so the case than y, then discussing x and y as if they were equally the case would be to talk as if something was true that was false. When it comes to the truth of something, there is no guarantee that all parts of that truth are equally at play — x could be 10% of the whole picture; y, 2%; z, 88% — in order to find out, we would have to explore a given thing very closely, and if we find unequal distribution, when we discuss our findings, we could be accused of over- and under- emphasis, of ideological bias (notably to those who haven’t carried out the same investigation as have we). And it is very likely we will find unequal distribution: the world does not seem to care much that we yearn for simple, equal distributions of causes.

In regard to one matter, it might be the case that all variables are equally at play — x, 33.3%; y, 33.3%; z, 33.3% — but in regard to another, the breakdown might be far more complex — u, 0.8%; v, 0.2%; w, 9%; x, 20%; y, 20%; z, 50%. In the more complex breakdown, since z is 50% the cause, would it be justified to discuss z and rarely u, v, w, x, and/or y? Perhaps I would be justified to discuss it 50% of the time, but if I did so all the time, I would discuss z in a way that did not reflect reality: I would suggest by my time-use that z was the one and only cause. Certainly, it’s the main cause but not the only cause, and it’s very possible that actually z is only able to be the prime cause when in concert with u, v, w, x, and y, that if u was removed, for example, z would cause nothing at all. Perhaps not, but determining this would require investigation, and certainly if I mostly discussed z and rarely u, I would suggest that z would be the main cause even if u wasn’t present.

Emphasis can suggest independence outside relation, situation, and environment, and yet if I don’t emphasis z, then I suggest that there is no reason to focus on z and that z is equally causal with the variables (that the case is something more like u through z each are 16.66%). This would be false, but does this mean I should breakdown say a presentation according to how much a given variable is at play (for example, if v is 0.2% the cause, then I should discuss it for 0.2% of the time; if x is 20% the cause, I discuss it 20% of the time; etc.)? If I don’t do this, I could be accused of over- and under- emphasizing, of failing to depict reality, but what are the chances of anyone in the audience knowing this is the right breakdown anyway (especially before my presentation in which I inform them of the breakdown)? If nobody does, then in their minds, I am indeed over- and under- emphasizing unfairly: I would have to also argue in my presentation that the emphasis is justified. But wouldn’t this just be the presentation (of which the audience might not hear because they are too busy being upset at my perceived misemphasis)? And how is it even practically possible to breakdown a presentation into time-segments so precisely? Practical hurdles and realities might keep me from making myself immune to criticisms of poor emphasis.

Also, if it is indeed the case that the causal breakdown between variables only occurs when the variables are in concert, then should I break down time allotment unequally, seeing as that inequality only arises when there is equal involvement?¹ Some in the audience may say I shouldn’t and others may say I should. Someone will be unhappy; someone could bog down the discussion and accuse me of ideological bias. Unless perhaps I can achieve “balanced emphasis,” but isn’t that a contradiction?

III

An equal distribution of causal variables is rare in this life, and so (at least an appearance of) emphasis is likely necessary in many circumstances in order to “accurately represent” something, and yet in all of those circumstances, if I am making an argument, I could instantly be seen as ideological, biased, politically motivated, and the like. And even if it was the case that for a given thing or circumstance there was an equal distribution between causes, then the very nature of language itself would make it impossible for me not to come off as emphasizing something (disproportionally) (language makes dialectics hard, as discussed in Thoughts). I must discuss something first, and if I choose to discuss x instead of y, people could wonder why I chose to talk about x instead of y unless I thought x should be discussed first. But I had to discuss something first, and perhaps x was just as good as y in my mind, but if someone claims that I’m just saying that, how could I prove them wrong? Would it be worth the time to prove them wrong? How could I ever get anything done if all my time was spent defending the structure and order in which I spoke? And no matter who I satisfied, given the nature of language, I could fall right back into the problem next time I opened my mouth…(“No exit.”)

Also, if I have been asked a question about current failures in the stock market, how could I not emphasize the downtowns over the examples of success (or at least that not be to which people most pay attention)? It doesn’t help that people don’t tend to be interested in stories, presentation, or arguments about how everything is great: it’s when something is wrong that people tend to care. Hence, human nature itself is toward emphasizing the bad over the good (for the good is like a doorknob that works, to allude to Heidegger: “invisible”). We are “toward” deemphasis in a manner that makes the world seem worse off overall, regardless if the world actually is worse off. Consciousness itself doesn’t seem to equally emphasis all the things of life.

On the other hand, if someone were to ask me to talk about the successes of Capitalism, if I were to discuss all angles, how could I not come across sounding like the problems of Capitalism don’t bother me? Perhaps knowing this, I might mention some problems with Capitalism at the start and end of my presentation, hoping to come off as moderate, but if I discuss the benefits 60% of the time and the problems 40% of the time (as the format of the discussion might require of me), I could be accused of Conservative bias. If someone were to ask me a neutral question like, “What are your thoughts about Capitalism?’” and started by saying, “Capitalism is a great system, but x,” I am likely instantly seen by the audience as “following the script” and being a Liberal, and everything I say afterwards could either be too quickly dismissed or too quickly accepted. And yet maybe I am a Conservative, and aware of the problem of emphasis, I might be starting my answer that way precisely in hopes of getting Liberals to listen to me who otherwise wouldn’t. Aware of the problem of emphasis and ideology, I must structure my speech in a way that tries to work around it.² I will fail, but maybe I can at least mitigate the damage. (There is a “gymnastics to speaking” that perhaps only the alive and vibrant “spirit of philosophy” can overcome.)

A truth composed of an unequal distribution of causes cannot be relayed without emphasis, but where there is emphasis, there could be accusations of bias, and indeed, maybe bias and misrepresentation are at play. There’s no way for us to know without being the experts ourselves, and if we don’t trust experts anymore due to a “legitimation crisis” (as Habermas discusses), then we might just be trapped forever in “emphasis battles.” Even if there was an emphasis of x over y, if someone with authority did this, that authority could help concerns of emphasis from erupting into a force that deconstructs the discussion and thinking. But where authority is gone, has a “pandora’s box” been opened? Perhaps, but looking to Hegel, that doesn’t mean the error cannot be a way to truth.

IV

Emphasis is dangerous: there is wisdom in trying to avoid bringing it up in discussions, papers, presentations, etc. as much as possible. But emphasis is also necessary: a completely equal distribution of causes is rare, and so to treat all variables as equally responsible and/or “at play” would likely fail to describe reality. Also, there are some historical periods where rationality is in decline and so needs to be stressed, where stressing “nonrationality” would in a way be false (though this requires the capacity to “discern the mean” and proportion, as Jockin emphasis, which is a big ask). And then an age can arise where “nonrationality” is in decline and “autonomous rationality” a threat, and in that age stressing “the need for both” could be problematic (because if our age is say 20% nonrational and 80% rational and we begin “stressing both,” we might just end up changing nothing—the stresses just cancel one another out, or we end up 30% nonrational and 70% rational, per se). We must prove able to discern our historic moment, which is difficult if school isn’t teaching us such a capacity.

So, what do we do? In addition to avoiding the topic of emphasis unless necessary, it may also help if we draw a distinction between “ideological emphasis” and perhaps “distributive emphasis,” and to realize that both emphasizes will seem to be present where one is, though this isn’t necessarily the case. If we understand that we must emphasize anger regarding someone who is usually angry to tell the truth (for example), then we will not have a knee-jerk reaction whenever we detect emphasis. Likewise, if we understand that homelessness in one city may be a result more of bad housing policy than bad choices (though the opposite could be the case in another city), then when we hear a politician emphasizing housing policy over bad choices, we will not instantly assume the politician is a Liberal.

If we learned to stop immediately assuming x or y upon encountering emphasis, this may go a long way in helping “distributive emphasis” prevail over “ideological emphasis.”³ Furthermore, we should learn that those who bring up a problem of emphasis are then responsible for justifying the critique: if one argues that x is overemphasized, for example, then the person is responsible for arguing why and the proper distribution between x, y, and z. Emphasis should not be noted and left hanging, for then it can function as a lazy criticism that adds little value. But as discussed throughout O.G. Rose, if our lives are necessarily dialectical, then we must learn how to “honor” the sides of our dialectics, and that might require “focusing” on one side of the dialectic over the other at different times. But this act will not necessitate “a hierarchy,” even though it might seem that way, as “emphasis” doesn’t necessitate a judgment of superiority. We must be sure not to assume this, though that might prove difficult.

Our minds cannot present reality to us in an equal way: we must live in a particular place and thus experience the ideologies, ways of life, etc. of the people of that place unequally with the ideologies, ways of life, etc. of people who live in another location. We cannot read all books, let alone all books with equal focus, and so we will absorb some arguments better than others. We simply cannot go through life experiencing it equally, without some ideas, worldviews, ways of life, etc. being emphasized and experienced as “more present” than others. Hence, we all have reason to think that some things should be emphasized over other things, that failure to do so is failure to depict reality (and don’t forget that reality often actually does require emphasis to be rightly depicted), and yet this (ostensibly) “justified conclusion” is due to our circumstances (and everyone must live in some circumstances). Hence, just in being ourselves, we hurled into the middle of “the problem of emphasis.”

As elaborated on in The Absolute Choice, on this point, we can touch on Hegel, whose description of reality as dialectical and “passing over into otherness” is arguably precisely why we are stuck “tarrying with (the negativity of) emphasis” (so it goes with an “ontology of relations” where relations are more real than things). If there is always a point where freedom “passes over” into slavery, where justice “passes over” into grace, where Conservatism “passes over” into Liberalism, and so on, then it is wrong to speak as if the choice is simply between “freedom or slavery,” “justice or grace, “Conservatism over Liberalism,” etc. If we pick freedom to structure our society, we also pick the conditions of possibility for slavery; if we identify with Conservatism, we identify with that which, at a certain point, becomes Liberal. What’s the point? Well, that we are always emphasizing whenever we identify, define, or render something intelligible: the mistake is acting like emphasis is unique and avoidable. It is not. Emphasis is ubiquitous.⁴

When we discuss “Conservatism,” for example, we are emphasizing “the Conservative side” of what is actually a “Conservative/Liberalism,” per se; when we discuss “freedom,” we are emphasizing “the freedom side” of a “freedom/slavery”; and so on. Every x contains “otherness,” and so every “x” is ultimately just an emphasis of a “x/otherness” (A/B), which isn’t necessary a bad thing but instead unavoidable. We must emphasize to function in a dialectical reality, and yet emphasis can also be a problem: to function, we must risk disfunction. But if we at least knew that and accepted the inevitably and necessity of error, we might come to deal with the fire of our minds more reverently. Overall, the point is that in a dialectical world, all we ever do is emphasize, and that is why pointing out emphasis can be a problem: it can be to act as if we are doing something unique from what we are always doing, which is a mistake of unreality that can lead toward breakdown, inefficiency, and self-effacement.

V

Drawing this work to a close, admittedly, much more needs to be said to justify Hegel’s ontoepistemology, but it is also important to note that for Hegel philosophy is not simply meant to be dialectical and a realization of ontological dialectics, but ultimately philosophy is to engage in “speculative reason.” What does Hegel mean? A lot, but here it will be enough to say that where we mishandle emphasis, we are likely to lose imagination and creativity (which by extension could cost us our drive and “intrinsic motivation,” as often discussed in O.G. Rose). And I think we see this: where there is “emphasis police” calling people out for “emphasizing this” or “emphasizing that” (as if this isn’t what we aren’t always necessarily doing), there is little room for political, economic, or social imagination together — there is only fighting. This isn’t to say conflict can’t be generative and productive, but it is to say that where emphasis is mishandled, conflict will likely not bear fruit.

In closing, emphasis is dangerous and necessary, likely to be used in service of ideology, and yet “gets at reality” in a world of unequal causes. Embedded into our very world and “frenemy minds” are threats to democracy and civilization, and if we cannot learn to live and work with these threats, they will overcome us. “The problem of emphasis” cannot and even shouldn’t be avoided, both since reality rarely consists of equally distributed causes, and because of the natures of speech, presentation, and language themselves — but this means democracy is always in jeopardy. Jürgen Habermas has convinced me that the problems of democracy can only be solved with “more democracy” (somehow), and yet the more I explore the problems of this world, the more it dawns upon me how difficult it is to follow that seemingly simple prescription: it seems the nature of reality and everything in us are against it (there is a way in we need to be “more natural,” but what “nature” means in Hegel is very different from what we might understand). Life is dialectical, as Hegel teaches, and so democracy to be “more democratic” must somehow become “more dialectical” as well. Ultimately, this will require a change in and spread of a new kind of subjectivity, one that Belonging Again calls “Childhood” (A/B vs A/A).

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Notes

¹This “variable concert problem” may especially be present in theological discussions, where say in Christianity God’s grace only exists when God’s justice is in play, and yet God’s grace might be more of a defining feature of Christ’s message than God’s justice. Hence, grace only exists in the context of justice, but the emphasis is on the role of grace. Should grace and justice be discussed equally then, or would it be justified to more so discuss grace? Or is it a question of how should justice be discussed given the emphasis on grace? Everyone could have different views, and so theological discussions can easily be brought to a screeching halt due to concerns about misrepresentation and bias.

²But if the people in the audience have read the paper “Emphasis” by O.G. Rose, they may know exactly what I am doing, feel it is “scripted” (another paper by O.G. Rose), and so my efforts will fail — hence why the argument of this paper must be grounded in the nature of reality itself (A/B vs A/A), a reason why Hegel matters.

³Perhaps we could just use the term “distribution” for “distributive emphasis” and “emphasis” for “ideological emphasis,” removing use of the term “emphasis” except when used problematically? Perhaps we should say that one “distributes x” when depicting an unequal distribution of causes in reality and that another is “emphasizing x” when speaking out of bias and ideology? Perhaps, but no language is perfect.

⁴As is categorization and judgment, discussed in Thoughts, which are themselves intellectual acts which require emphasis to be possible — which also suggests their limits in never being able to fully capture “the dialectical movement” of phenomena “into otherness.” All categories, judgments, “emphasizes” — the must be held with “an open hand,” or else we move into a falsity in acting as if our reality is stable and full of “things” (which for Alfred Korzybski leads to madness).

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