Meaningful Maps, Global Brain Singularity, and Real Speculations (Part IV)
The Logic of Hegel on Religion and Absolute Knowing, Peterson and Last

IX
Why exactly is Peterson wrong to emphasize that if every individual person were to get his or her life in order, the society and world would be fixed? That seems straightforwardly true, and I don’t disagree with it in a sense, but the suggestion is that if everyone in Religion (A/A) became “heroic,” all would be well, and there would be no need for Absolute Knowing (A/B). The reason things are not so simple is because a society is more than “a sum of its individuals”; the Social is an emergence that is irreducible to its participants. As thinkers like Peter Berger and Pierre Bourdieu teach, a society exhibits its own unique behavior while exhibiting “top-down causation” upon its members: what happens in a society is not just what follows from all the causes and effects of its people, but also the causes and effects of its people are what they are in light of the social order they form (it’s a two-way street). This isn’t inherently a bad thing, but it means we have to take Sociology seriously if we are to deal with our historic moment.
Peterson emphasizes that people “get their own house in order” before they try to save the world, and generally I think this is very good advice that I would associate with Dostoevsky’s warning that we mustn’t come to love humanity at the expense of individuals. But if I told you to “get your house in order” and you lived under Capitalism, what this would possibly mean to you is that you go to school, get a degree that can get you a job, start building a career, and so become the kind of person who can support a family. Isn’t this great? It can be, if things go according to plan, but what if we are in a world where “plans” are increasingly unreliable due to technological advancement or a breakdown in the social contract? Cadell writes how studying ‘the technological singularity’ lead to a realization that ‘all [his] previous models of planning were fundamentally flawed because they seemed inspired by the pathways for personal development that only made sense in the 20th century.’¹⁶² This in mind, if I “get my house in order” according to Capitalism right before an AI Revolution dramatically changes the job market, I might end up in a horrible situation and devastated. In this way, what happens in the society exerts “downward causation” on my choices (possibly causing an unfortunate “flip moment”): relative to me, I was “responsibly causing myself to have a good future,” but relative to the social order, I was “causing myself to be poorly positioned for the future.” The meaning and value of my action was not just up to me: the society also had a say and could cause the meaning of my actions to change “right under my feet” (this hints at why technology and society are profoundly linked, as we’ll discuss).
‘If we each live properly, we will collectively flourish’ — this is an underlying thrust of Peterson’s thought, and it’s not entirely wrong, but what if it is impossible to determine what it means to “live properly and/or fittingly” for the future world, because it is too complex and “flips” too rapidly?¹⁶³ The social order will have a say on if our choices were “proper” or not, and what is a good decision today could be a terrible decision tomorrow. Just even twenty-years ago, not going to college was seen as a horrible decision and could humiliate our parents, but now going to college is increasingly seen as a terrible waste of money and not as desirable as a blue-collar job that might be harder to automate. If I “got my house in order” twenty-years ago and did that which the society taught me was “proper,” I could be now worse off than someone who didn’t “get their house in order” (according to the logic of “making the most of your potential”) and instead became a mechanic. Now, Peterson might reply that all this just means that “living properly” twenty-years ago was actually not going to college, and so his point could stand, but this a problematic angle, because we are always operating with “limited knowledge” and therefore can’t know what it means to “live properly” relative to the future. In fact, “doing what’s responsible” could get us in trouble.
In a world that was more stable, less complex, and where the social contract was more reliable, the probability that following Peterson’s advice today (relative to the present social values) would lead a person to relative success in the future was higher, which also means that just staying in Religion was also less problematic. But this is why Cadell emphasizes Hegel’s historical process, Global Pluralism, Global Capital, and the Global Brain: the future is radically unpredictable, and Cadell always keep this “radical unpredictable” at the ground of his thinking. If Peterson keeps mythology at his base, Cadell more so keeps ‘the technological singularity […] fundamental.’¹⁶⁴ Peterson also emphasizes the centrality of meaning for human existence, and in an Age of Religion, successful plans for the future could perhaps help us have a meaningful life. But in an Age of Absolute Knowing, characterized by the Global Singularity, flourishing cannot be planned. Meaning must always be prepared for, in every age, but to the degree it must follow from preparation can vary between historic moments of Reason, Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Knowing. Faced with dramatic technological shifts, meaning for us is heavily something unplannable; we must encounter it, which means we must be able to handle surprise (Love(craft)).
Peterson is not wrong to draw attention to ‘the possibility of establishing a relationship with God by attending to conscience,’ but there is the risk in this to act as if our conscience is not “always already” forever socialized, and if technology and society are indivisible, then our conscience is also shaped by technology in our experiences of the world and itself. We are all cyborgs, in this sense, indivisible from our tools, and so the God a person before the printing press might encounter in their conscience is easily different from the God a person after the internet might internally encounter.¹⁶⁵ All this doesn’t mean that Peterson is wrong, but it means that there is not a clean cut between our internal and external lives, and that our external world has an unpredictable say on what it means to “live properly,” which is increasingly indeterminable due to accelerating complexity. But wait, if our internal lives are shaped by technology and our environments, isn’t Peterson right to focus on conscience and consciousness, because that could be an isomorphic window and source of insight into the greater world beyond us? Yes, it could be, assuming the technological rate of change is not incredibly fast; if it is, the technology and environment which our conscience might reflect could be obsolete by the time we’ve learned to connect with it, which also means our understanding of God could also be outdated. What then?
Defending mythology and “the truth of the Bible” even if not literal history, Peterson asks: ‘Are the facts more real than the instrument that allows for the determination of facts?’¹⁶⁶ Hegel would say no, and Peterson’s point is valid, but if we agree we also need to note that our instruments for determining facts are not safe within us from influence: as Sociology stresses, there is no hard division between internal and external spaces. ‘We cannot help but see the world through a story,’ true, but that might mean we’re worse off in a “Pynchon Risk” and/or trapped if technology is advancing faster than our stories can be rewritten in light of the very technology which is getting away from our capacities to make intelligible.¹⁶⁷ As discussed in “Factviews, Net-Works, Situation Creation, and Map-Mazes” by O.G. Rose, the framework by which reality is understood is just as important as our facts of reality, but that framework is also influenced by our reality, and that means our world influences the framework through which we might connect to God and ourselves through our conscience (and “inner space” more generally). And what if that means we are trained by technology to understand ourselves and God in a way that sets us up to be unprepared for how technology will next change the world? This is an ironic and terrible realization possible for Absolute Knowing, one that can be faced and then tarried with, but not for Religion: the Religious will be set-up to be enclosed by their conscience and so vulnerable. They might be in touch with “God,” but they will not readily have ‘the capacity to prepare for the unexpected and innovate in uncertain conditions.’¹⁶⁸ ‘The only thing that remains certain in [our] situation is the constant process of self-othering,’ which “conscience” will only afford to us to the degree it is constantly (re)shaped by “shocks of difference,” and hence in the Social with Zarathustra.¹⁶⁹
As we have already discussed, I do not disagree with Peterson that there are patterns and “maps” if there is anything intelligible at all — the brain is “always already” patterning, ‘designed to make sense of the unknown,’ or else overwhelmed by chaos — but taking this realization seriously, as Peterson does, can at best get us to Religion; for Absolute Knowing, our focus must shift to the libidinal, which to say we must take seriously sexual difference, desire, drive, etc., concerns which are indivisibly bound up with technology (for just as soon as a new technology is invented, we seem to instantly think about how we can use it sexually).¹⁷⁰ Without Peterson and so Jung, we can’t make it from Spirit to Religion, but Religion, however necessary, is not enough for Global Pluralism, politics, or Capital.
X
I agree with Peterson that a role of society is to make the world more predictable than not, but another function of society is technological development, which today is making the world less predictable. Perhaps for most of history technology helped make the world understandable, and to the degree it helped us encounter the unknown (say through the invention of ships, technologies of exploration, etc.), the technology didn’t accelerate our encounter with the unknown so much that it overwhelmed us. But Virilio is critical now, for the technology at the heart of our civilization is accelerating at a rate that we cannot handle, breaking down our social contracts and ability to predict the future. For society to rather function in a more straightforward way that reduces chances of overwhelming chaos like Peterson rightly warns is important, we’d have to remove much modern technology from our midst, which could cause a profound catastrophe economically, politically, etc. (and also seems impossible given Game Theory dynamics like Multipolar Traps). Also, this technology we cannot readily separate from our lives necessarily connects us with the entire planet and its diversity, meaning all of us are increasingly regularly encountering “strangers” (as Peterson discusses) who can complexity and challenge our understandings of the world (risking a “cascade”). The technology is also possibly “manipulative” versus “convivial,” as Illich discusses, which means there is a force of possible tyranny at the core of our societies, a force that the society is also using for its functionality and making the world intelligible: to remove the technology to assure we are not manipulated would be to risk how we understand the world, making it alien again. What is to be done? Abandon technology? If we stay in Religion, I do not see how that is not ultimately basically what must occur: to say something bold, in my view, all logics stuck in Religion ultimately lead to something more Amish.
‘A society ‘works’ to the degree that it provides its members with the capacity to predict and control the events in their experiential field — to the degree that it provides a barrier, protection from the unknown or unexpected’ — this is a major pillar of Peterson’s thinking, one that is not wrong but complexified once we understand that technology today is making society fundamentally unpredictable, and at the same time technology cannot be removed from society easily at all (it is stitched right into its essence). A society is defined by its (relation to) technology , and that means that if we are entering an age where technology necessarily makes society unpredictable, then, following Peterson, the only choices we will soon have are between “anti-society societies of unbound technology” or “pro-society societies of bound technology.’ By “bound technology,” I again have in mind Ivan Illich on technology and even the Amish, which is not a community that is “anti-technology” but very conscious of the impacts of technology on the social order, and so the Amish take introducing new technologies very seriously: they don’t let the market make that decision for them (we might say they are “top-down” regarding technology for the sake of culture versus let culture emerge more passively).
The Riddle of Amish Culture by Donald B. Kraybill is an important book that goes into detail on the culture, and there is pictures in that book of ‘[a] modern kitchen in a contemporary Amish home’ — it does not look like the “1700s” or something at all.¹⁷² A key to the Amish is understanding that they are not anti-technology outright, but that they see technology as a threat which could ‘obliterate their close-knit community’ (and, given the world today, evidence is on their side that this is true…).¹⁷³ The Amish though aren’t fleeing from the modern world — that is a misunderstanding — but instead, as Kraybill puts it:
‘the Amish have chosen to resist and negotiate with modernity rather than run from it. Resistance and negotiation are the primary social strategies that the Amish have used to preserve their identity in the face of modernization. The traditional side of Amish life, maintained by resistance, tils backward to the past. However, their willingness to negotiate with modern life reflects an openness to change and progress.’¹⁷⁴
A mode “like this” seems necessary to keep technology “convivial” versus “manipulative” following Illich, but then the question is, “What is being negotiated to be maintained?” If we are stuck in Religion, for culture, we must be negotiating to maintain a lack of interaction with Global Pluralism, Global Capital, and the Global Brain, and indeed this, for good and for bad, is what the Amish do. Key tenets of their community:
‘1. Symbolization of core values […]
‘2. Centralized leadership […]
‘3. Social sanctions […]
‘4. Comprehensive socialization […]
‘5. Controlled interaction with outsiders.’¹⁷⁵
Please read Kraybill’s work for elaborations on these, but the point is that ‘[t]he Amish have used these five defensive tactics to preserve and safeguard their distinctive cultural heritage.’¹⁷⁶ The Amish have actively thought and tarried with how socioeconomic and technological structures cannot be separated from cultural transformations, and so they have put themselves in the middle of this “contradiction” as a community to work and think it (they have navigated both ‘cultural bargaining’ and ‘structural bargaining’) — to keep these neatly apart in our mind, as if “they’ll take care of themselves” without our active tarrying, is perhaps a grave hangover of modernity, pragmaticism, Capitalism, and the like.¹⁷⁷
What the Amish have understood is that technology is essentially part of a society: its presence is not accidental or something that can be present without changing fundamentals regarding what a society “is” and how a people think about themselves as “people.” Peterson stresses that society requires a “stabilizing-culture” or else life is too unpredictable for people to handle, but what the Amish understand is that “destabilizing-technology” always moves to the heart of society itself. A society then isn’t additively a “stabilizing-culture and/or destabilizing-technology” (“hero and dragon,” A/A); instead, it is always dialectically a “stabilizing-culture/destabilizing-technology” (“hero/dragon,” A/B). Society is contradictory: it holds together that which stabilizes and that which destabilizes at the same time, and Cadell’s point is that Global Capital and Global Technology (which are indivisible and basically two-sides of the same coin) are now far faster and more powerful than stabilizing-culture; furthermore, destabilizing-technology is training us out of habits to handle culture according to values and “modes of being” which are distinct from technological orientations. The essence of a society is A/B: we cannot neatly divide culture from technology, for a society is their very “bounded-up-ness.”
Staying in Religion without Absolute Knowing—living today as if Peterson is “practically enough”—will require us to be more Amish than not. And we see in the Amish that though technology isn’t outright banned, we will have a lot less of it, and furthermore we’ll have to be very vulnerable to foreign invasion (if we have a standing army, we will have a large central government, and necessarily have to use high-level technology—perhaps the threat of foreign attack is the key driver of technology, Game Theory Problems can only be countered with nonrational pacifism, bringing to mind Karatani’s Ionia). Again, Religion and Peterson are “practically enough” if we are to be more Amish—I think far more social alternatives to Capitalism ultimately point to something Amish than realize it, by their own logic—but if not we will require Absolute Knowing (and again please note being Amish is also only enough if we accept that we will be killed if an army invades us: we cannot ourselves have a modern military to defend us). I personally lean toward Ivan Illich, discussed in II.1, but that will require Absolute Knowing—hence our challenge.
XI
As Cadell writes, ‘the future itself looks a lot less like an inevitable utopia/salvation/peace at the end of our (your) current plan, and much more like an alien world that will rip from us all conscious and unconscious presuppositions of being (including potentially our human being).’178 Religion is necessarily presuppositional, while a key thrust of Absolute Knowing is the acceptance that thought requires presuppositions that cannot be justified and yet nevertheless are necessary, which invites us to ask the question on what “presuppositionless thought” might be like (The Absolute Choice will discuss “intersuppositional thought,” though we will not elaborate on that here). We might know this in Religion as well, but simply say everyone must choose a Religion and be orientated from there by their presuppositions (we each must be a “presuppositionalist,” as Joel Carini has critiqued, which is “to just accept internally consistent systems”), which means everyone must choose a “map” and do their best. Fair enough, and this posture is not abandoned in Absolute Knowing, but the focus is on “the spaces between maps” (Global Pluralism), and asking if there are presuppositions there (in the “metaxis” of William Desmond or space of Metamodernism of Greg Dember). A movement of thinking “maps” to “between maps” is a move from Religion to Absolute Knowing, and the claim is that technology forces us to social incorporate and deal with “spaces between maps,” and hence we must think them with Absolute Knowing. Otherwise, there will be pathology (which is dire if ‘in the 21st century we are facing something similar to what our avian dinosaur friends experienced 65 million years ago […]).179
Absolute Knowing is a capacity to deal with Global Pluralism and complexity beyond the logic of a Religion (which will inevitably lead to violence and/or isolation), and if few have this capacity, we will need Capital to deal with complexity for us, which it will by “flattening.” This is discussed in II.1, and where we lack capacities for ‘conceptual meditation,’ we will ‘inevitably encounter problems of both belonging and meaning,’ but in Religion it can be the case that Capital makes up for our lack of Absolute Knowing without dire consequence (“a hero versus the dragon”); now though, approaching the Global Brain, Capital is turning into a threat against belonging and meaning (“a hero/dragon”).¹⁸⁰ How so? Capital makes the world predictable by “compressing” and/or “flattening” everything into what is fungible and exchangeable (everything can be made intelligible as something that can be sold and price), and hence humans can become less dynamic and more replicable by AI, precisely because they then get into habits of only thinking of things according to practical and economic potential and valuation. This makes everything similar and possibly “equal” to one another, a point we have elaborated on in “The Situation of Capital,” which compares Leibniz and Marx (and that opens II.2): if bread is worth $10, I can think “bread = $10,” and furthermore believe something else worth $10 is exchangeable for the bread (“bread = four oranges”). This is not inherently bad, but it can train us into a mode of understanding and thinking about the world of which, precisely because it is effective, can habituate us out of other modes of understanding: because it works to make someone understandable to me when I think “he is an engineer and/or he makes $60,000 a year,” I can get in a habit of thinking about people in those terms, versus “he is Samuel” in the sense that I am acknowledging a radical singularity who will always entail an excess I never fully capture. “Singularities” are impossible to fully know, and that can be uncomfortable and make me feel like I am dealing with someone who is unpredictable, which Peterson is right to emphasize we don’t like experiencing.
If we take this seriously, we can see that Capital today is doing the work of society according to Peterson: it is making things intelligible and more predictable so that we are not overwhelmed by the unknown and can survive, and perhaps a reason Capital is so strong today is because it is uniquely effective at making the world intelligible, and the Pluralistic world is uniquely complex and hard to predict; hence, we have helped spread Capital so that the increasing diversity of the world doesn’t overwhelm us with a growing sense of the unknown (Global Pluralism without the omnipresence of Global Capitalism seems unimaginably hard to comprehend, for at least the great diversity of the world as that in common). It is hard to imagine what else could help make Global Pluralism more intelligible to us but Global Capitalism, and which is not necessarily a bad thing; however, the great problem is that Capital accomplishes this effort by making us ourselves more predictable. This is critical: there is a difference between a society that provides predictability because it has trained humans into being more similar and less dynamic, and a society that is provides predictability because it has equipped people with capacities for handling complexity, negativity, and the unknown.¹⁸¹ And the question is this: can Peterson provide us the resources to tell and maintain the differences between a “manipulative predictability” and a “convivial preparedness”? Cadell might say that maintaining this difference in ourselves and lives requires us to handle facing libido (‘most fundamentally defined as ‘psychic sexual energy’ ’) versus letting Capital numb or handle libido for us (as Žižek often describes); the problem with Peterson is that if he lacks psychoanalysis, then despite his great important in helping us to Religion, he lacks the resources needed to address libido for Absolute Knowing.¹⁸²
Why do I speak as if Capital and technology are so closely related and basically indivisible? This is a point that Nick Land and Mikey Downs can further help make, but basically technology and economies move together, especially with Capital, because Capitalism provides the pricing mechanisms and supply chains that make advanced technology possible, so if a society has advancing technology, it will also have advancing Capital markets (at least as of 2025), which means the two come together with the habits they form. Hence, if technology is always at the heart of a society, so too (especially today) will be its economics, and if the technology/economy-mechanism trains us into certain habits and ways of being, then that technological habituation cannot be cleanly divided out from the society (as “not what it is”). And if the society entails at its heart both forces that stabilize and destabilize at the same time, then the society “is” that contradiction, and must always be thought of as such. Hence, today (unless more Amish than not), a society is that which makes the world predictable so that we can handle it, while at the same time it is precisely that which is birthing the technology/economy which is making the world radically unpredictable and alien. Descriptions of society as “just” reducing unknowability are too one-sided and hence Religious (A/A); the descriptions need the dialects of Absolute Knowing (A/B), where the hero doesn’t just tarry against a dragon, but also “tarries with the negativity” of finding in success and goodness his or her self to be a hero/dragon.
But wait, isn’t it a contradiction to say technology “flattens” us and makes us less dynamic while at the same time making the world more complex and unpredictable? It seems that way, but it’s actually why our situation is so dire: technology is making us less dynamic while making the world more complex. And at the same time, humans “are” ultimately that which are fundamentally unknown and “lacking” (Žižek), so it’s ultimately impossible to make us actually less dynamic (unless that is we’ve somehow stopped being human…): this effort is ultimately a repression which leads to pathology and so self-effacement. And so we can understand our situation this way: Capital and Technology are making us less able to handle a complexity which we fundamentally “are” (which can cause mental illness and trouble), while at the same time making our environments wildly complex. This is arguably the worst of all possible situations, but must it be this way? I don’t think so, but we must use technology for “a social coordination mechanism,” as described in II.2.
A society’s culture, technology, and economics are always interconnected, and the way the economy can help make the world predictable to us is by making us less dynamic, which means it makes us less able to tell that the world is unknown and complex. However, we “are” complex, and so this move also makes us less capable of understanding ourselves, but we at the same time cannot escape the feeling of knowing we don’t understand ourselves (due to “essential lack,” as described by Lacan and even C.S. Lewis in The Weight of Glory), while we might be more able to avoid feeling like we don’t understand the complex world beyond us. But since we lack the resources as subjects, then to approach this “lack,” we will have to deal with it through pathological and self-effacing strategies (perhaps more neurotic, perhaps more psychotic…perverse…), which further makes us unprepared for the complexity of the technological world. But what if we don’t experience the world as complex? Ah, the problem is that the world is more complex, but that this is basically hidden from us (due to how technology trains and habituates us), until one day “The Real” shows up and “breaks through” (say through mass unemployment caused by AI or a major cyberattack), at which point we would no longer be able to “cover from ourselves” the complexity and unpredictability of the world—and that could be a trauma which, if we’re not prepared for (and only Absolute Knowing can so prepare us), could be our annihilation. Thus, the means by which technology makes the world predictable to us (as Peterson is right to emphasize) is at the same time training us to be unprepared for when the Real of technology is no longer concealed or deniable. And that point it will easily be too late. The argument is that Peterson in Religion does not provide us the sources we need as subjects to handle this future. We need Absolute Knowing. The stakes are high.
Peterson defends the Social as needed for us to survive the unknown, but the Social can either make the world predictable by making us incapable of experiencing the unknown, or it can make the world predictable by making us prepared and capable of handling the unknown. While Capital lessens our complexity (a “numbing,” perhaps), the Social either increases our capability to handle complexity, or it isolates us away from complexity (more Amish). Our argument for a “new address” is to consider the possibility of a Social which trains us to handle complexity, “shocks of difference,” and “tarrying with negativity,” which is the world of “spreading Childhood” discussed in Belonging Again (Part II). (“The Meta-Crisis” arising to “The Poly-Crisis” follows from staying in Religion (A/A) when Absolute Knowing (A/B) is needed.) Is this even possible? If not, the future is too determined for Hegel’s tastes.
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Notes
¹⁶²Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 439.
¹⁶³Peterson, Jordan. 12 Rules for Life. Toronto, Canada: Random House Canada, 2018: xxxv.
¹⁶⁴Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 439.
¹⁶⁵Peterson, Jordan. We Who Wrestle With God. New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2024: xxiv.
¹⁶⁶Peterson, Jordan. We Who Wrestle With God. New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2024: 11.
¹⁶⁷Peterson, Jordan. We Who Wrestle With God. New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2024: 11.
¹⁶⁸Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 440.
¹⁶⁹Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 442.
¹⁷⁰0Peterson, Jordan B. Maps of Meaning. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999: 185.
¹⁷¹Peterson, Jordan B. Maps of Meaning. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999: 226.
¹⁷²Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 17.
¹⁷³Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 16.
¹⁷⁴Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 17.
¹⁷⁵Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 18–19.
¹⁷⁶Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 19.
¹⁷⁷Kraybill, Donald B. The Riddle of Amish Culture. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 20.
¹⁷⁸Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 442.
¹⁷⁹Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 443.
¹⁸⁰Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 465.
¹⁸¹And as elaborated on II.1, if Capitalism requires dynamics individuals for there to be entrepreneurs, without which Capitalism stagnates, then Capitalism might train us out of the capacities it requires us to have so that it doesn’t stagnate, precisely in habituating us into approaching the world as “fungible” and “pragmatic,” which is to say our “background of intelligibility” becomes overly-simplified, stifling creativity. This means there could be something self-effacing at the heat of Capitalism — though perhaps this very “contradiction” is a feature in that it will potential force us into a negation/sublation of Capital into something more Creative and Childlike. “Encountering surprising contradiction” is arguably the logic of Hegel’s movement of history…
¹⁸²Last, Cadell. Real Speculations. Philosophy Portal Books, 2025: 539.
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