I really enjoyed this survey. I think that there is a
power in tracing the lineage of an idea as opposed to the back and forth of thinkers. It allows us to lay over top of the notion, that a man can have an idea, a cooperating notion that an idea can have men. I think we would do well to look at the corners that philosophy ‘didn’t take’ because I expect we will find a landscape of thought that is much more ecological than that; where frameworks for knowing live with (fight, fuck, trade and travel) one another.
To me though, it doesn’t make sense to worry about how an idea or its association would make it ‘seem’, especially if that seeming is silly. On the one hand my mind says, ‘that’s more a fear than a thought.’ On the other, fearing an appearance prioritizes an inauthentic representation of an idea, and that seems like no good way to relate to ideas in whom we find a good measure of truth. Those kind of camp-games are themselves silly anyways. No one ever ‘seems’ smarter by making someone else ‘seem’ silly.
Thank you for reading, Sam! I agree that looking in ignored corners of philosophy is very important, and that’s frankly where I’ve found the most interesting ideas. I also agree that it’s a mistake to worry about an idea “seeming foolish,” because that can actually be a sign of its power and truth (something Feyerabend argued). Yes, on the face of it, it seems ridiculous to question “A = A,” but when we look into it there’s a lot there to be considered and explored.
I really enjoyed this survey. I think that there is a
power in tracing the lineage of an idea as opposed to the back and forth of thinkers. It allows us to lay over top of the notion, that a man can have an idea, a cooperating notion that an idea can have men. I think we would do well to look at the corners that philosophy ‘didn’t take’ because I expect we will find a landscape of thought that is much more ecological than that; where frameworks for knowing live with (fight, fuck, trade and travel) one another.
To me though, it doesn’t make sense to worry about how an idea or its association would make it ‘seem’, especially if that seeming is silly. On the one hand my mind says, ‘that’s more a fear than a thought.’ On the other, fearing an appearance prioritizes an inauthentic representation of an idea, and that seems like no good way to relate to ideas in whom we find a good measure of truth. Those kind of camp-games are themselves silly anyways. No one ever ‘seems’ smarter by making someone else ‘seem’ silly.
Thank you for reading, Sam! I agree that looking in ignored corners of philosophy is very important, and that’s frankly where I’ve found the most interesting ideas. I also agree that it’s a mistake to worry about an idea “seeming foolish,” because that can actually be a sign of its power and truth (something Feyerabend argued). Yes, on the face of it, it seems ridiculous to question “A = A,” but when we look into it there’s a lot there to be considered and explored.